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1. Introduction and Research Problem 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have been a viable part of corporate strategy over the last years. 
The amount of M&A activity is rising over time, especially in recent periods, whereas the deals 
occur all over the world and in all industry sectors. With the raising popularity and importance of 
these transactions among the firms the vast research has been dedicated to examine and find 
general and common determinants of the M&A activity. Although the literature covered up 
many aspects of M&A there are still gaps in the research which can be filled in. Hence the aim 
of this master thesis is to examine one of the previously not sufficiently researched aspects; the 
different M&A types with respect to their clustering to industries.  
Within this master thesis, the theoretical foundations of M&A will be presented, focusing 
on the merger waves and theories explaining them. In course of that, the main objective is to 
detect one of the facts accompanying M&A; the clustering of M&A types by industries. 
Although this fact seems to be well-known in the existing literature there is a little effort to find 
possible explanations of this phenomenon and link it to different M&A types namely horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate types. As a consequence of this lack in exploration the research 
problem of this thesis was formulated. The problem is associated with two main research 
questions. The first research questions aims at proving of the fact of industries’ clustering in 
M&A activity also in different types of transactions and hence it is phrased as “Do the different 
M&A types cluster by specific industries?”. Since according to the previous findings in literature 
the overall M&A activity is clustering by industries it can be assumed that this matter will hold 
also for horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&A. The verification of the first question 
naturally leads to the effort of finding possible determinants why some industries experience 
more horizontal deals while in others vertical or conglomerate type prevails. Theoretical 
background suggests that this is linked with common features or conditions in specific industries. 
Therefore the second research question has to be answered: “Which characteristics of industries 
have effect on the occurrence of the specific M&A types”. The main concern is laid on the 
industry-level rather than on firm-level research on the contrary to the majority of the previous 
literature. This enables the formulation of general implications for M&A activity with respect to 
different merger types.  
The thesis is divided into two major sections. The first one focuses on general 
information and theoretical background of M&A in order to gain insight when different merger 
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types are carried out and how they are linked to industries’ characteristics. Hence, the theoretical 
section embodies the basis for the research problem’s analysis. Firstly, the identification of 
different M&A types is presented; namely horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&A. Each 
type is motivated by different aspects which are discussed in detail. Secondly, the major merger 
waves are described and the underlying theories explaining them are introduced. Shortly the 
M&A regulation in the European Union is presented since the research is made on merger data 
from the EU. Finally, the theoretical section is completed with the overview of relevant literature 
and hypotheses development which is associated with different available economic theories such 
as transaction-cost theory or mentioned merger waves theories. Directly connected with this part 
is the second section of the thesis which demonstrates the empirical analysis and its results. The 
research is made on merger cases in the EU in time period from 1990 till 2000 through 
appropriate statistical methods in order to extend the analysis beyond the previously deeply 
examined US cases. The emphasis is laid on the examination if the theoretical framework and 
the formulated hypotheses are supported by presented results and if the general implications can 
be developed. Furthermore, the research questions will be answered. 
The purpose of the thesis is to bring some additional insight into M&A activity. Despite 
some methodical difficulties the research aspires to introduce new reliable aspects of different 
merger types what might constitute the direction of further empirical analysis.   
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2. General introduction: Definitions and Motives of M&A 
2.1. Introduction to M&A activity 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have been viable option of corporate strategy for a long time. 
Meanwhile M&A have become more popular and therefore an extensive research has been made 
on this topic in numerous management disciplines. It includes various aspects like reasons for 
M&A, value creation by M&A, merger waves, post-acquisition integration and even cultural 
dynamics of M&A. However there is still room for finding new unexplored subjects and further 
research. 
The M&A activity has recently started to increase again after the substantial decline 
caused by economic turmoil in 2008 and the value of worldwide M&A totaled $2.6 trillion in 
20111. The most active target industries were energy and power sector (accounted for almost 
20%), financials and materials sectors (each accounted for 13%) followed by industrials and real 
estate sectors (each scored 9%)2. These findings are proving two facts about mergers: the 
fluctuation of merger activity suggests that there are the merger waves and merger activity tend 
to cluster by industry sector. 
Although M&A can be very advantageous both for the acquiring and target firm in terms 
of improved financial performance through economy of scale and positive effect on stock return 
there is a need for regulation from the side of the government to avoid increased market 
concentration leading to decreased price competition. While developed countries have their own 
processes in regulating M&A (e.g. in the US approvals from Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice are needed3, in the EU regulation is provided by European Commission 
Merger Regulation4) the developing and emerging countries are facing difficulties with setting 
up the effective merger control. In the time of increased amount of cross-border mergers and 
raising contribution of merger deals in these countries there is essential need for international 
cooperation between competition authorities to ensure an effective review of these transactions 
(i.e. an initiative from OECD by organizing policy roundtables on cross-border merger control5). 
                                                 
1 Thomson Reuters, “Merger and Acquisitions Review Full Year 2011”, p.1 
2 Thomson Reuters, “Merger and Acquisition Review Full Year 2011”, p.2 
3 Gersdorff, Bacon (2009), p.2 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/regulations.html, accessed on 2.5.2012 
5 OECD, Policy Roundtables, Cross-Border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging Economies 
2011 
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2.2. General definitions 
 
In the beginning it is important to clearly define terms which will be used through this 
work. First of all, it is needed to understand what are mergers and acquisitions and how they can 
be divided according to their characteristics. The essence is that “at the core of M&A is the 
buying and selling of corporate assets in order to achieve one or more strategic objectives”6. The 
terms mergers and acquisitions are used interchangeably although they have different meaning in 
narrow sense. A straightforward definition of merger says that it is “any transaction that forms 
one economic unit from two or more previous ones”7 but the more precise definition that enables 
easier distinction from acquisitions takes in account four important aspects; these are that 
“neither company is portrayed as the acquirer or the acquired, both parties participate in 
establishing the management structure of the combined business, both companies are sufficiently 
similar in size that one does not dominate the other when combined and all or most of the 
consideration involves a share swap rather than a cash payment”8. However “pure” mergers are 
rare and one example is the merger between two pharmaceuticals firms SmithKline Beecham 
and Glaxo Wellcome in 2000. On the other hand acquisition “is the purchase of one organization 
by another”9. This purchase can involve target’s stocks or business operations and its assets10. In 
connection with acquisition two terms describing the engaging companies are used: acquiring or 
bidder company and target company. The acquirer is a company which buys the other firm, the 
target. It is notable that often in empirical research these terms are used interchangeably and also 
the most relevant database of Thomson Financials Worldwide M&A records all corporate 
transactions of at least 5% of the ownership of a company over the total value of $1 million till 
year 1992 afterwards it records deals of any value. It involves not just M&A deals but also other 
transactions such as stock swaps, leveraged buyouts, tender offers etc11. The DOME database 
which is used in the empirical part for research covers all types of transactions too; such as 
majority ownership, joint ventures due to the competition regulation rules by the European 
Commission. Further, in this work terms merger, acquisition or M&A will be used 
interchangeably with no emphasis on the strict definition if not stated otherwise. 
                                                 
6 Stowell (2010), p.63 
7 Weston et al. (1990), p.4 
8 Coyle (2000), p.3 
9 Alao (2010), p.555 
10 Coyle (2000), p.4 
11 
http://www.alacra.com/partners/partner.asp?content=Thomson+Financial+Mergers+%26+Acquisitions&database=
%2Falacra%2Fhelp%2Fsdc2%2Ehtm, accessed on 2.5.2012 
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There are several criteria according to which M&A can be classified. The following table 
represents the different types of M&A in accordance with their characteristics. 
 
Distinguishing feature Types of M&A 
Relationship between firms 
• Horizontal 
• Vertical 
• Conglomerate 
• (Concentric) 
• (Congeneric) 
Mood of the bid 
• Friendly 
• Hostile 
Presence on stock market 
• Private 
• Public 
Form of financing 
• Cash-financed 
• Stock-financed 
Nationality of firms 
• Domestic 
• Cross-border 
Table 1: Types of M&A 
 
 Distinguishing between different types of M&A is in many cases straightforward. 
Friendly acquisition differs from hostile takeover in target’s management approval. When 
target’s management approves the bid and cooperates with acquirer in the way it recommends its 
shareholders to accept bidder’s proposition. On the other hand, in case of hostile takeover target 
management is unwilling to sell the company or it has not knowledge about the bid. In these 
cases target’s management can exercise strategies against takeover such as golden parachutes, 
crown jewels or poison pills. It can be argued that friendly bids are primarily driven by synergy 
gains and on the other hand, hostile bids are undertaken in order to discipline the 
underperforming target management12. The amount of hostile bids is decreased from 1980s to 
1990s (14.3% to 4%)13 but hostile takeover activity peaked again in 2007 when it generated 12% 
of total deal volume globally14.  
                                                 
12 Morck et al. (1988), pp.101-102 
13 Andrade et al. (2001), p.106 
14 Capaldo et al. (2007), p.1 
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 According to the presence on the stock market it can be distinguished between private 
and public M&A. Private transaction takes place when target and bidder are not listed on any 
public stock market. On the other hand, public deal occurs when both firms are listed on stock 
market which is often the case15. Further M&A can be financed either by cash or stock. Stock-
financed deal is a transaction when bidder company exchanges its stock for target shareholder’s 
stock, i.e. target shareholders become shareholders in bidder firm. These two types of 
acquisitions have different impact on value creation. Through short event study where the 
average abnormal stock return at merger announcement is used as a proxy for value creation or 
destruction it was found for the acquirer’s side there are negative abnormal returns of -1.5% 
when financed through stock and in the case of cash-financed deal there is positive effect of 
0.4%. Also target shareholders are better off with cash-financed transaction; 20% compared to 
13% when financed with stock16.  
 Considering nationality of firms when bidder and target companies are active in the same 
country deal can be classified as domestic and on the contrary when bidder is operating in 
different country than target it is a case of cross-border M&A. Although cross-border deals are 
much more complex and involve greater considerations by competition authorities they are 
becoming more popular due to consistent establishing of companies in the emerging markets in 
M&A activity. In 2010 they generate 40% of global M&A volume17, a substantial increase from 
20% in 2000 and 30% in 200518.  
 The most relevant differentiation is according to the relationship between firms in three 
main groups: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate M&A. Beyond them some authors also 
mention concentric type of deal which happens “between firms with highly similar production or 
distributional technologies”19  and is centered on core competences such as marketing with the 
goal to use them properly or to develop new competences20. Further, some authors use the term 
congeneric merger which is defined as merger of firms in the same industry which do not have 
any customer or supplier relationship21.  The three most spread terms can be viewed from more 
perspectives e.g. corporate strategy or industrial organization and there are different reasons for 
their realization. 
                                                 
15 Gugler et al. (2012), p.11 
16 Andrade et al. (2001), p.111 
17 Cogman, Sivertsen (2011), p.1 
18 Capaldo et al. (2007), p.1 
19 Walter, Barney (1990), p.80 
20 Farschtschain (2012), p.6 
21 Brigham, Houston (2009), p.659 
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 Horizontal merger can be defined as “a combination of two firms in the same line of 
business”22 i.e. firms are in the same industry and at the same stage of production process. In 
narrow sense horizontal merger “occurs when firms in the same industry, producing identical or 
similar product and selling in the same geographical market, merge”23. The typical reasons for 
horizontal mergers are economies of scale, expanding of product portfolio and increase in market 
share. Industrial organization theory notes that horizontal merger raises concerns about rising 
concentration in market and subsequent increase in price which reduces the aggregate welfare. 
Important work of Williamson (1968) handles the issue of balancing reduction in competition 
and efficiency gain. It can be argued that firms engaging in merger are experiencing cost-savings 
which are contributing to efficiencies enlarging aggregate welfare. If the cost-savings are high 
enough to maintain the original price the aggregate welfare will be increased through merger. 
However, if the original price is increased the consumer surplus is reduced what leads to 
deadweight loss. Nonetheless it was showed that efficiency gain is often larger than reduction in 
consumer surplus24 so it can be concluded that the existence of cost-savings is offsetting the 
increase in price unless it is a large increase in price therefore antitrust authorities should 
consider this fact in a process of disallowing of merger25. Other important point from industrial 
organization theory is the “merger paradox” which claims that it is unprofitable for firms to 
engage in mergers and this is showed on basic economic model. It is only beneficial to 
participate in merger if the more than 80% of the firms collude26 what will legitimately raise 
antitrust concern. However, if the are substantial cost-savings either in variable costs or fixed 
costs merger can be profitable for engaging firms. This suggests there might be other reasons for 
mergers than just cost-savings. 
 Vertical merger “occurs when a firm producing an intermediate (or a factor of 
production) mergers with a firm producing the final good that uses this intermediate good, or 
when two companies who have a potential buyer-seller relationship prior to a merger merge”27. 
This type of merger is mainly motivated by economies of vertical integration which is 
characterized by facilitation of coordination and administration since a company merges either 
with supplier or a customer. Extreme vertical integration is not profitable (e.g. airline merges 
with food company to facilitate distribution of food to its clients and employers in the planes). 
                                                 
22 Brealey et al. (2006), p.871 
23 Shy (1995), p.173 
24 Williamson (1968), p.21 
25 Williamson (1968), p.34 
26 Salant et al. (1983), p.193 
27 Shy (1995), p.174 
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An alternative to vertical merger is outsourcing which is nowadays very popular28. According to 
industrial organization theory vertical integration prevents double marginalization what improves 
market efficiency. Double marginalization can be described as a situation where the 
manufacturer produces product which it sells to retailer at wholesale price. Consequently the 
retailer sells this product to the customer at the retail price. Since both manufacturer and retailer 
want to make profit the customer pays inefficient price due to double margin over the real cost of 
product. When the manufacturer and the retailer merge due to the incentive to increase their joint 
profit29 also consumers are better off since they pay lower price. However, vertical merger might 
not be efficient because of the facilitation of price discrimination or foreclosure i.e. when a firm 
refuses to supply or buy from non-merged rivals.  
 Conglomerate merger can be defined broadly as a merger that “involves companies in 
unrelated lines of businesses”30. It can be also differentiated between various types of 
conglomerate mergers according to Federal Trade Commission. The first one, product extension, 
happens when the acquiring and acquired firms are functionally related in production or 
distribution. Market extension merger involves companies that produce the same products but 
sell them in different geographical markets. The last conglomerate merger type is other 
conglomerate which occurs when firms are essentially unrelated in products they produce and 
distribute. This type of merger occurred mostly in 1960s and 1970s and nowadays they are not so 
popular. Possible reasons for conglomerate merger are protection of organization-specific human 
capital, entrenchment or because of strict antitrust policies against horizontal and vertical 
mergers31. Although this type of merger raises the lowest antitrust concern the profitability and 
performance are not improved as they would be through horizontal and vertical mergers32.  
  
2.3. Motives for mergers and acquisitions 
 
After general overview of types of mergers it is important to mention the most important 
motivation factors for M&A activity to better understand the process of decision to engage in 
this transaction and which mode the companies choose. Although there are reasons for mergers 
which are rational and support the improvement of performance of merging firms there are also 
cases when firms pursue M&A because of disputable motives. It is important that firms can 
                                                 
28 Brealey et al. (2006), p.874 
29 Church, Ware (2000), p.686 
30 Brealey et al. (2006), p.871 
31 Matsusaka (1993), p.358 
32 Lubatkin (1987), p.47 
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distinguish between them and correctly decide how to proceed in order to act in accordance with 
interests of firm and its shareholders.  
 The reasons why firms engage in M&A are numerous and they vary over time. Table 2 
lists some of the most important motives which are divided according to their rationality into two 
broad groups, rational motives and dubious motives. Each motive is mentioned and grouped by 
logic which stands behind these motives. Then each motive is discussed in detail and it is 
explained what their objectives are. 
 
2.3.1. Rational motives for M&A 
Firstly, the motives which can be classified as rational are discussed. Motive can be 
considered as rational when its objective is to contribute to an increase in firm’s performance and 
the preservation of shareholders’ interests. There must be a good intention from managers and 
also actual enhancement after realization of transaction. These motives can be induced both by 
efficiency considerations (i.e. to enhance the efficiency of the merged company) and also by 
external forces like the firm’s environment and its competitors. 
  
 Operating synergy 
 Generally, synergy can be defined as a fact that the combination of two (or more) 
companies creates enhanced company’s functioning resulting in increase of shareholders’ value 
what can not be reached independently by each company. There are several types of synergies 
such as operating, financial, cost or revenue synergy. The first two of them are mentioned but 
they are also interconnected with other two types and they can not be considered as independent 
entities. 
 Operating synergy results from the way how the company is operated. The main sources 
are economies of scale, economies of scope, economies of vertical integration and 
complementary resources.  
 To economies of scale is referred in the case of the merger when firms can profit from 
shared production, central services, distribution and other operations of firms. When firms share 
their production they can decrease their overall average costs by the spreading of fixed costs over 
the shared production facility33. Fixed costs include salaries, insurance, lease payments, interest 
expenses and others.  Due to the nature of economies of scale it is one of the most natural goals 
                                                 
33 DePamphilis (2012), p.5 
 12 
of horizontal merger where firms producing the same product share their operations more 
efficiently.  
Operating synergy 
• Economies of scale 
• Economies of scope 
• Economies of vertical integration 
• Complementary resources 
Financial synergy 
• Lower cost of capital 
• Surplus funds 
• Tax considerations 
Eliminating inefficiencies 
• Mismanagement 
Induced by efficiency 
considerations 
Rational motives 
Market power 
Strategic realignment 
• Technological change 
• Regulatory and political change 
Induced by external 
forces 
Diversification 
Increasing EPS 
Lower financial costs 
Misvaluation 
Buying undervalued assets 
Induced by 
considerations from 
financial perspective 
Dubious motives 
Process outcome 
Empire building 
Hubris 
Managerialism 
Induced by 
management 
Table 2:  Overview of motives for M&A 
  
Economies of scope refer to a strategy when two firms combine in order to use their 
specific set of skills, know-how or an asset to produce multiple product lines in the merged firm 
more efficiently than separately34. This suggests that it can be one of the reasons for vertical 
merger but it depends on how much the products are related or not. The example of firm which is 
                                                 
34 DePamphilis (2012), pp.5-6 
 13 
regularly engaging in acquisitions in order to benefit from economies of scope is Protector & 
Gamble which shares market development organizations and business services for the broad 
range of products35. Its product portfolio ranges from cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, food to small 
electrical appliances36 suggesting the previous undertaking of several vertical or even 
conglomerate acquisitions. 
 Economies of vertical integration are in some extent related to economies of scope. This 
term on the contrary to economies of scope do not take in account the different products but the 
relationship between the combining firms. Economies of vertical integration are a synergy 
flowing from facilitation of coordination and administration when a firm decides to merge either 
with its supplier or customer37. This type of synergy is used by the firms engaging in vertical 
mergers. 
 Complementary resources are resources which enrich each other i.e. it is beneficial to 
combine these different resources in order to reach an improvement that can not be achieved by 
possessing only one of these resources. One good example of exploitation of complementary 
resources can be seen in the combination of small and big firm whereas small firm can have 
unique business idea or product but it does not have sufficient funds for realization or production 
and on the other hand, big firm has enough resources to provide production and other well-
developed business services38. This type of synergy can be utilized both in horizontal and 
vertical M&A.  
 
 Financial synergy 
 The second broad group of synergies is financial synergies which include the lower cost 
of capital, surplus funds and tax considerations. These types of synergies on the contrary to 
operating synergies do not consider improvement in operations of firms but the enhancement in 
financial situation and subsequent benefits for the combined firm.  
 The positive effect of M&A is a lower cost of capital of combined firm. Cost of capital is 
a minimum return that should be promised to investors and lenders in order to receive capital for 
company from them. The cost of capital can be reduced “if the merged firms have cash flows 
that do not move up and down in tandem, realize financial economies of scale from lower 
                                                 
35 http://www.pg.com/en_US/company/global_structure_operations/corporate_structure.shtml, accessed on 
18.5.2012 
36 http://www.pg.com/en_US/brands/all_brands.shtml, accessed on 18.5.2012 
37 Brealey et al. (2006), p.874 
38 Brealey et al. (2006), p.875 
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securities issuance and transactions costs”39. This type of synergy is not bounded to any specific 
type of merger. 
 The special case of financial synergy is when one firm possesses surplus funds. 
Especially mature firms have a substantial amount of cash but they do not have enough 
investment opportunities. They have two options how to exploit this excess cash. The first one is 
to please its shareholders through paying them dividends or engaging in share repurchases. The 
second option is to redeploy their capital by undertaking mergers financed by cash to ensure 
them a future growth40 (i.e. acquire a firm which have a plenty of investment opportunities and a 
great potential for growth). This motive is driven by free cash flow theory i.e. cash is used in an 
efficient way preventing managers to use them in the inefficient way such as empire building. 
The mature and the growing firms can be located in the same industry then horizontal merger is 
possible. However, if the whole industry is mature it is inevitable for a firm to engage in a 
vertical or conglomerate merger in order to reach the growth.  
 Companies should also not forget about taxes when they are complementing M&A. The 
combined firm can mainly profit from tax loss carry forwards (i.e. if the firm realizes loss in one 
year it can carry the loss in some extent to the next years to reduce tax base and pay less taxes). 
This can be achieved when one firm acquires a firm with accumulated losses and the combined 
firm can use them to offset future generated profits41. The second consideration is the tax shield, 
i.e. tax benefit when firm has a debt that decreases its profit and therefore taxes paid. In this case, 
the combined firm can benefit from an increased leverage. To this result comes when a very 
profitable firm which is at the same time highly taxed overtakes a lowly profitable firm which 
pays fewer taxes. Hence it is advantageous to acquire a competitor which is less successful than 
the acquirer as it is in a case of horizontal acquisition. 
  
 Eliminating inefficiencies 
 The last motive which is induced by efficiency considerations is to eliminate 
inefficiencies. This is closely associated with the fact that managers often do not act in 
accordance with shareholders’ interests. This problem is called agency problem and it is related 
to the fact when managers do not own shares of the company or just small fraction of shares. In 
this case they do not act as agents of shareholders as they are supposed but they pursue their own 
interests such as keeping their job and enjoying of the job benefits. This can lead even to empire-
                                                 
39 DePamphilis (2012), p.7 
40 Brealey et al. (2006), p.875 
41 DePamphilis (2011), p.12 
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building, seeking of prestige and dysfunctional organization. However, shareholders try to 
control management and threaten them with firing when their interests are not followed. 
Therefore managers are motivated to increase growth of the firm and they may be prone to 
overinvest. Overinvestment problem says that managers cause their firm to grow beyond the 
optimal size since they undertake investments with negative net present value42. In this case, 
acquisition can be efficient way how to replace underperforming target management. Hence, the 
threat of takeover is often motivation for managers to act as agents of shareholders.  
  
 The next subgroup of rational motives which do not result from operation of firm but they 
are induced by external environment therefore the firm have to adapt to the situation. The 
consideration is directed on competitors and the aim is to gain a greater market power. This is 
based on the fact that the firms merge to gain a greater market power what allows them to set 
higher prices that were not possible if the market was competitive. The aim is to get monopoly 
power. Although it is plausible why firms pursue this strategy the well-functioning antitrust 
authorities do not allow such practices. This motive mostly drives horizontal mergers, i.e. the 
firm merges with its competitor to increase market power, but in some cases it can also induce 
conglomerate mergers. This is the case when conglomerate acquisition employs these activities; 
(1) when a firm uses profits generated in one market to secure market share in other market, (2) 
limiting a competition in more than one market simultaneously e.g. through tacit collusion with 
competitors, (3) deterrence of potential entrants from the markets where firm is active43.  
 Secondly, the firm has to consider also changes in its environment such as technological 
or regulatory change and adapt to them in order to stay competitive. This approach is called 
strategic realignment. Technological change drives today’s global market. There is a continuous 
innovation that produces new products and industries. Firms have to adapt quickly in order to 
stay on the market. One of the options how to manage survival is to acquire other firms in order 
to increase market share or to diversify its operations (i.e. all types of mergers are viable). One 
example of technological change is the emergence of digital camera technology. Kodak failed to 
adapt to the new situation in the beginning of year 201244. However, its competitor Fujifilm 
pursued a successful strategy of diversification through acquisitions and today besides selling 
films it offers a wide range of solutions like imaging solutions (e.g. electronic imaging and 
photofinishing equipment, information solutions (e.g. medical systems and optical devices) and 
                                                 
42 Jensen (1986), p.323 
43 Trautwein (1990), p.286 
44 http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/eastman-kodak-files-for-bankruptcy/, accessed on 19.5.2012 
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document solutions (segment operated by Xerox)45. Further, the firm has to consider regulatory 
and political change which influences all the firms in the market. When a government carries out 
deregulation affected firms are facing stimulated competition and are motivated to increase their 
market share through acquisitions. This can even lead to merger waves as it will be discussed 
later in this work. In this context it is also important to mention industry consolidation since 
deregulation can trigger overcapacity in the concerned industry. Mergers are efficient solution in 
this case when there too many firms and too much capacity in the industry46. Deregulation can 
drive all types of mergers (i.e. horizontal, vertical or conglomerate) it depends on how extensive 
this deregulation is.  
 
2.3.2. Dubious motives for M&A 
Besides rational motives for M&A there are also some dubious motives. The 
management of the firm can defend their reasoning why they undertake merger but although they 
may believe in correctness of them usually these mergers do not lead to the increased 
performance of the combined firm. These motives can be mainly induced by management or 
tried to be justified by financial perspective.  
 The firms often try to justify their acquisitions by diversification. Diversification indeed 
decreases risk but the question remains if this reduction of risk is a sufficient gain for a company. 
It is often more costly and more difficult to diversify for the firm than for the stockholders47. 
Especially unrelated diversification, i.e. diversification in new lines of businesses mainly through 
conglomerate mergers, is pursued by management because of poor motives (e.g. reduction of the 
risk of their human capital, to assure continuation of the business or entering new lines of 
business in hope for improvement when facing poor performance) and reduces the shareholders’ 
welfare48. Investors also do not consider these mergers as beneficial but riskier because the 
management might fail to manage the combined firm when it does not have enough 
experiences49. Further, related diversification brings more positive returns than unrelated 
diversification50 suggesting that horizontal mergers brings more economies of scale and other 
cost-savings than conglomerate mergers. This fact advocates the need for more focused firms 
which can be more efficient in easier alignment of incentives for management and preventing 
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building of empires. Trend of focused firms can be seen in the rise of acquisitions in the same 
industry through time51.  
 Managers often justify their pursuing of acquisitions by increase in earnings per share 
(EPS). There may be the increase in EPS by the combined firm but it is not reached by real gain 
such as financial synergy or cost-savings. Indeed, there is no economic benefit meaning that the 
firms are worth exactly the same together as they were apart which is suggested by falling price-
to-earnings (P/E) ratio. The earnings growth can be achieved through the purchase of slowly 
growing firms with low P/E ratio but it is important to be aware that it is not real growth from 
capital investment or improved profitability52.  
 If two firms combine there are no additional cash flows but their overall debt capacity is 
increased and therefore they have lower issue costs of debt. In well-functioning bond market 
they may borrow at lower interest rates but this is not always valid. However there is no net gain 
in merger; the merger increases bond value (or reduce interest payment) but this is caused only 
by the reduced value of stockholder option to default. Therefore the merger will deliver gain 
only in the case when the firms are in financial distress and financial distress is costly53. In this 
case the aggregate risk is lower and value of equity is increased. 
In capital market often happens that some firms possess private information about 
overvalued or undervalued shares. Managers try to take advantage of this information when 
deciding about acquisition. Misvaluation theory refers to “the efforts of bidders to profit by 
buying undervalued targets for cash at a price below fundamental value, or by paying equity for 
targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder”54. Therefore if bidder’s 
shares are overvalued it is less costly to buy target’s shares when financed by stock. The dilution 
of ownership of acquirer’s shareholders is also less vigorous what is important for acquisition’s 
approval from the shareholders since the shares represent claims on the firm’s earnings55.  
However, the estimation of the volume of the firm’s own overvalued shares might be too 
optimistic and the merger might not be accompanied with other synergies which are necessary 
for the combined firm’s long-term high performance. Hence the misvaluation motive is often not 
justifiable since the post-acquisition stock price performance of such motivated acquisitions 
declines with the time56.  
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Another dubious motive tried to be justified by financial considerations is the buying of 
undervalued assets. The q-ratio in the case of acquisition is the market value of the acquirer’s 
stock relative to the replacement cost of its assets57. The firm should undertake an acquisition in 
the case when it is costly for it to buy (or build) the asset and there is a firm with low q-ratio (q-
ratio is less than 1, i.e. market value is less than it would cost to replace the assets)58. However, 
this benefit accrues from the initial cost-saving in the merger but without any other synergy the 
long-term performance of the combined firm may decline.  
The second subgroup of dubious motives comprises of motives which are induced by 
management from wrong intentions. These are the process outcome, empire building, hubris and 
managerialism. Process outcome theory refers to the repeated strategy of managers to acquire 
firms without consideration of all matters. Since the managers have a limited information 
processing capabilities (i.e. they do not evaluate all the possibilities, simplify the decision 
process) and they are vulnerable to slip into organizational routines (i.e. they repeat the in the 
past successful actions without consideration of new conditions)59 they often engage in mergers 
only because they have experienced this type of transaction in the past without any actual 
synergy. Therefore these mergers often fail to reach the desired performance. 
The managers of the firm often engage in empire building what is closely related to 
agency problems theory. Since the managers are not the owners of the firm their incentives are 
different from shareholders’ ones. Managers seek for the growth of the firm to enjoy more 
perquisites and possibly higher income without consideration if the growth is desired. Therefore 
they acquire other firms in order to reach the growth but also in this case without any other 
synergy between merging firms the transaction does not deliver any value to the shareholders.  
Secondly, there are other manager’s selfish reasons why they undertake acquisitions 
besides the empire building. It is related to the fact that companies leave its conduction to the 
planning and management of professional mangers, called managerialism. Although managers 
possess the necessary knowledge and experiences they still might follow their own interests such 
as prestige, increase in their salary or preservation of their job. However, managers are under 
constant pressure to maintain or even increase the share price and this pressure becomes stronger 
as the firm is growing so managers undertake large acquisitions which might be value-
destroying60.  
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Finally, the last dubious motive is hubris and the “winner’s curse”. Managers tend to be 
too self-confident if they have experienced successful acquisitions in the past. Managers bidding 
a target may overestimate positive effects flowing from the merger and want to finish the deal at 
all costs. Managers overpay for target especially in the situation where there are more bidders. 
They do not want to give up or admit the loss because of their hubris. The winner can after the 
finishing of the deal realize that he overpaid and feels a remorse so called “winner’s curse”61. 
Although the bidding process is started because of the right motives it is important to realize 
when the competition is driving the price up and let the deal go.  
 
3. M&A Waves and Merger Waves Theories 
3.1. M&A waves 
 
In the literature were identified various reasons for merger waves, from which four main 
theories evolved. In this section the major merger waves will be mentioned and afterwards the 
theories explaining the merger activity will be discussed. 
In the history of business world there were many mergers and acquisition and in some 
periods even waves of this activity were identified, i.e. period of the high amount of such deals 
or high transaction volumes caused by M&A in comparison to other quiet periods. In following 
paragraphs the major M&A waves are listed and their characteristics are discussed.  
3.1.1. The first wave (1898-1904): “Great merger wave” 
The first merger wave, which is also called “great merger wave”, was preceded by 
technological and organizational innovations, the depression period of the 1980s, new 
incorporation legislation and the developing of New York Stock Exchange to the effective 
market for securities62. Although the Sherman Anti-Trust Act came into enforcement in 1890 
and should have prevented monopolization its real enforcement proved to be difficult63 and many 
of mergers aimed at the increase in the market power even through monopoly rather than on 
economies of scale. Horizontal consolidation affected mostly primary metals, transportation and 
mining industries64. For example, U.S. Steel achieved from 1892 till 1908 33.75% of industry’s 
capacity through M&A65 and became one of the biggest companies. The end of the wave came in 
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1904 when the equity market crashed and because of the Northern Securities Case when 
Theodore Roosevelt (that time’s American president) prosecuted the railroad merger and made 
antitrust laws more powerful66.  
3.1.2. The second wave (1916-1929): Merger for oligopoly 
After the Sherman Act gained stronger authority and addition of other antitrust laws such 
as Clayton Act in 1914 monopoly became heavily outlawed and the firms instead of seeking of 
monopoly creation engaged in acquisitions leading to oligopoly (i.e. lower market share than it 
was the case in the first wave)67 or in vertical integration. These strategies should prevent 
antitrust issues and focused on expansion through economies of scale. The second wave was 
ended by the 1929’s stock market crash and subsequent economy depression68. 
3.1.3. The third wave (1965-1969): Diversification wave 
The Second World War and economic depression delayed the new merger wave until 
1960s. In 1950 the Celler-Kefauver Act amended former Clayton Act and specified that also an 
acquisition of assets in target firm was against antitrust laws along with the acquisition of the 
stock in competing company if the overall competition was reduced. Further it clarified that also 
vertical mergers should face the same antitrust restrictions as horizontal mergers69. The 
acquisitions in this period were characterized by unrelated diversification, i.e. conglomerate 
M&A. This was partly caused by the Celler-Kefauver Act that disabled acquisitions in the same 
industry hence the companies were forced to diversify in unrelated businesses to avoid antitrust 
concerns70. Although the strict antitrust policy was unique in the US other countries like the UK, 
Canada, Germany and France experienced conglomerate transactions suggesting there are other 
reasons why these deals happened71. Firstly, the firms looked for the growth and pursued 
acquisitions in order to increase their EPS, high P/E ratio firms bought low P/E ratio firms 
without consideration of the relatedness72.  Secondly, in the time of less developed external 
capital markets (e.g. the market for risky debt was illiquid) the companies counted on their own 
internal capital market i.e. efficient allocation of funds to the divisions of the firm therefore it 
was beneficial to broadly diversify the firm to enable cross-subsidization73. Finally, managers 
due to the agency problem pursue their own interests and with large free cash flow in 1960s they 
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undertook unrelated diversification74 in order to reduce their personal risk and to entrench 
themselves75. The third wave was ended by oil crisis in 1973 and following economic 
slowdown76.  
3.1.4. The fourth wave (1981-1989): The return to specialization 
After conglomerate M&A in 1960s failed to reach improved performance it was 
inevitable that the change came in merger activity. Antitrust authorities liberalized their attitude 
and the mergers within the same industry stopped to be vastly prosecuted77. This leaded to 
reversion of the conglomerate M&A. Either the managers realized their faults and divested their 
unrelated businesses in order to concentrate on its own core business or this role was handled by 
hostile raiders78. Further the increase in the effectiveness of the external market (e.g. creation of 
junk bond market) and the rise of the leverage buyouts (LBO) as the efficient device to control 
agency problem of managers, since the debt has disciplinary function, contributed to the amount 
of the M&A. LBO, i.e. the purchase of the firm primarily with debt in order to convert public 
company to the private held one79, became very popular in this period but in the next period they 
disappeared80.  
The other novelty in this period was the rise of foreign acquirers (e.g. Europe or Canada) 
of the US companies. They “were motivated by the size of the market, limited restrictions on 
takeovers, the sophistication of the US technology, and the weakness of the dollar against major 
foreign currencies.”81  Due to the bankruptcies of LBO and the collapse of the junk bond market 
the merger wave came to the end82. 
3.1.5. The fifth wave (1993-2000): Wave of mega mergers 
The fifth wave differed from the previous wave in many aspects. Due the positive trend 
on the capital market, innovative technological changes, globalization, industry consolidation 
and continuing deregulation the number of deals and also the value of them rose substantially. 
Further M&A became more financed by stock (i.e. the amount of the LBO decreased); they 
continued to be undertaken in the same industries and became less hostile83. The hostility 
decreased, since the managers accepted the shareholder view of the company, and they 
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restructure the company willingly. The reasons for this change were the emergence of other 
corporate governance mechanism such as managers’ equity-based compensation, stock option 
plan, closer monitoring by shareholders and the board and the shareholder activism84.  The part 
of the acquisitions was motivated by misvaluation when the overvalued firms bought less valued 
targets without considering other essential synergies85 what leaded to the substantial losses for 
the acquirer’s shareholders86. The end of the wave was caused by the equity market collapse in 
2000.  
3.1.6. The sixth wave (2003-2007) 
The last wave was driven by low interest rates, rising stock market and the increase in the 
importance of the global economy87. The wave was characterized by steady growth of the cross 
border and private equity financed acquisitions till the peak in 2007 according to Thomson 
Reuters. The debt financing was again popular; the use of loan obligations or mortgage-backed 
securities increased88. The wave was ended by the worldwide financial crisis in 2008 caused by 
housing bubble and the loss of bank solvency.  
 
Figure 1: The major merger waves
89
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3.1.7. Summary of M&A waves 
In the Figure 1 the major merger waves from the early 1900s till 2006 are depictured with 
respective amount of deals eventually the deal value and also the events which ended the waves 
are showed. The last wave is missing the last year and the end event i.e. the worldwide financial 
crisis in the figure. Afterwards in Table 3 the major waves are summarized according to the most 
prevailing types during the wave and the major motives causing them.  
 
Time Period Type of M&A Activity Driving Motives 
1898-1904 Horizontal mergers • Marker power 
1916-1929 Vertical mergers • Operating synergies 
1965-1969 Conglomerate mergers • Unrelated diversification 
• Increasing of EPS 
• Managerialism 
1981-1989 Horizontal mergers 
LBO 
Hostile mergers 
• Operating synergies 
• Mismanagement 
1993-2000 Stock-financed mergers 
Less hostile mergers 
• Regulatory change 
• Technological change 
• Misvaluation 
2003-2007 Cross-border mergers 
Horizontal mergers 
Private-equity financed mergers 
• Operating synergies 
• Financial synergies 
Table 3: Summary of M&A waves 
 
3.2. Merger waves theories 
 
The literature evolved several theories of explaining the merger waves. They are based on 
different assumptions and showed that there are several determinants of M&A activity. The most 
important theories are discussed and in the end they are summarized by one empirical study that 
concludes which theory have the largest explanatory power.  
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3.2.1. The q-theory of mergers 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) argue that there are two distinct used-capital markets. 
One is for used equipment and structures (e.g. when firm A buys a machine from firm B) and 
second for bundled used-capital i.e. M&A market (e.g. when firm A buys a firm B and gets all 
firm A’s capital). The trading volume in these two markets is correlated, especially during the 
merger waves in the 80s and 90s90. The results support the Q-theory91 (i.e. the firm investment 
should rise with its Q92); Q has higher impact on M&A investment than on direct purchase of 
used-capital (coefficient of 2.2 compared to coefficient of 0.75)93. Further, the merger waves are 
being explained through reallocation waves. M&A activity should rise when the inter-firm 
dispersion of Q is high and high-Q firms should acquire low-Q firms in order to lower the 
differences among firms. This was confirmed on the relationship between dispersion of Q and 
the acquisitions where the correlation was detected.  
In later work, the impact of new technology is examined. When a firm faces a new 
technology it has two options to cope with this situation; it can either reorganize internally (e.g. 
retrain its workers, refit its buildings and equipment) or it can reorganize externally if it fails to 
reorganize internally. External reorganization can take either a form of liquidation (exit) or 
takeover. This reallocation process enables quick economic-wide spreading of a new 
technology94. Two main findings ensue from comparison of percentages of stock market value of 
total reallocation, entry-and-exit and merger targets. The first one is that each merger wave was 
accompanied by a rise in entry-and-exit because in time of technological shock both external 
reorganization forms are used95. Further it is proved that exits lead mergers, especially in 
electrification era. The second finding is that mergers have grown relative to exit strategy from 
1980s to 1990s because market values have risen due to increased importance of teamwork and 
organization capital and there were more suitable merger targets on the stock market96. Two 
major technological changes which have influenced the majority of sectors; electrification and 
internal combustion (1890-1930) and information technology (1970-2002) which are fitting the 
model  at most meaning they have led to mergers as the best reallocation type of transferring 
assets towards the more efficient firms97. Moreover there was a rise in average market-to-book 
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ratios for all firms, acquirers and exit/target firms during the IT period98 leading to the 
assumption that technology change positively influences the stock market. Finally, through 
simulation was proved that in the case of prohibition of mergers or absence of equity markets the 
reallocation wave prolongs itself substantially99 suggesting that merger is the efficient way of 
reorganization. 
 
3.2.2. The industry shock theory 
Harford (2005) suggests that merger waves occur as a result of economic motivation for 
merger transactions (i.e. high asset values induced by a specific industry shock) and relatively 
low transaction costs (i.e. increase in capital liquidity and reduction in financial constraints)100.  
The research was made on merger or tender-offer bids from Thomson Financial’s 
Securities Data Company (SDC) between 1981 and 2001 with a transaction value of at least $50 
million101. Industry sector was assigned according to connecting SIC code with Fama and 
French’s classification. The sample was divided into two periods 1980s and 1990s and merger 
waves were determined as 24-months. The wave was observed when the highest 24-months 
concentration of bids in specific industry exceeds the simulated empirical distribution (the 95th 
percentile); there were 35 waves from 28 industries102. The paper does not distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical mergers it takes in account all merger transactions only making difference 
in counting of occurrence of industries sectors. In the case of vertical merger it counts merger 
activity both in bidder’s and target’s industry and in the case of horizontal merger it counts only 
as one occurrence in specific industry103.  
The impact on the beginning of merger waves was proven on several variables. The 
industry median market-to-book ratio by itself has some explanatory power to predict merger 
wave however a model which takes in account the capital liquidity (measured by the commercial 
and industrial loan rate spread as proxy for low capital liquidity), a deregulatory event (years that 
were preceded by a major deregulatory event) and economic shock (constructed as the first 
principal component of these seven economic shock’s variables: net income, asset turnover, 
R&D, capital expenditures, employee growth, return on assets and sales growth) has notably 
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higher explanatory power and eventual addition of market-to-book to model has only marginal 
impact on correlation with merger wave104.  
Further, there was found strong correlation between the fraction of bids in industries 
undergoing industry-specific waves and the total number of merger transactions105 suggesting 
that when a majority of firms is exposed to economic shocks at an industry level at time of high 
capital liquidity an aggregate merger wave occurs106.  
 
3.2.3. The managerial discretion theory 
The managerial discretion theory assumes principal- agent problem between managers 
and shareholders of the firm. Managers are responsible for managing firms and their income is 
often tied to growth of the firm or to the size of the firm what can lead to so-called empire 
building of managers. The managers who are maximizing only their utility and do not act in 
interest of shareholders are constrained by the threat of takeover nevertheless they undertake 
value destroying mergers.  
Especially in the time of stock market boom the degree of optimism is raising and growth 
through mergers even conglomerate mergers is welcome. Managers can engage in more wealth-
destroying mergers since the decline in its share price would be only modest in comparison to 
normal conditions on the market. Many studies found weak or negative effects of mergers on 
profitability and negative returns to acquirer’s shareholders over long post merger window what 
was mainly prevalent in the conglomerate merger wave in 1960s and in stock market boom in 
1990s107.   
 
3.2.4. The overvalued shares theory 
The overvalued shares theory falls under behavioral theory of corporate finance which 
perceives corporate policies such as acquisitions as a response to market mispricing. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) constructed theory of merger waves which happen as a consequence of increased 
number of overvalued firms in stock market boom. Managers of an overvalued firm follow 
interests of its  shareholders when they engage in acquisition because in that way the firm 
realizes lower long-run negative stock returns (when acquisition is not undertaken market adapts 
its expectations about incorrect valuation and the share price falls sharply). Target’s managers 
agree to stock merger despite long-term unprofitable outcomes for its shareholders seeing that 
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target shareholders can gain in short-run when they sell the shares they obtained from bidder. 
This transaction is very convenient for shareholders who want to cash out. Second reason for 
accepting the bid offer is that target management is fairly paid through stock options, severance 
pay or keeping targets managers in top positions making their equity more valuable in long-
run108.  
On the other hand, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) indicates other reason why 
target are willing to agree to merger offer. Targets have only private information about its own 
value and are aware of the fact that there may be misvaluation due to a firm-specific and market-
wide component. Due to this fact target wants to evaluate the synergies flowing from merger and 
on the basis of positive assessment it accepts an offer. The first step is to filter out market-wide 
misvaluation effect and then accessing of synergies follows. In the period of high overvaluation 
in the market there is higher estimation error associated with the synergy therefore a target may 
underestimate the shared component of misvaluation and consequently overestimate the synergy 
effect109. Other interesting implication is that “within-sector mergers are more likely to occur in 
overvalued sectors than in undervalued sectors. Furthermore, on average, overvalued sectors will 
purchase firms in relatively undervalued sectors.”110 This may suggest that vertical mergers (or 
conglomerate mergers) will occur more often between overvalued and undervalued sectors.  
When testing the overvalued shares theory it is important to determine a measure for 
overvaluation. Usually ratios of market to book value of equity are used as in Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005). Market to book ratio can be decomposed into two parts i.e. market to value and value 
to book where the first part measures misvaluation. Therefore it is crucial to measure also value 
e.g. with sector-level, cross-sectional regressions of firm-level market equities111. Determination 
of overvaluation by researchers indicates that also capital market can identify overvalued firms 
what can lead to a subsequent adjustment in valuation.  
 
3.2.5. Summary of merger theories 
Empirical testing of the theories of merger waves came to different results supporting 
various theories. One of the most recent study, Gugler et al. (2012), tested all theories on both 
listed and unlisted companies. On the one hand, the q-theory of mergers and industry shocks 
theory would have the same impact on both types of firms (i.e. both will experience merger 
waves) and on other hand, the behavioral theories (managerial discretion theory and overvalued 
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shares theory) will only influence the listed companies (i.e. merger activity of listed firms is 
positively associated with optimistic valuation on stock market, merger activity of unlisted firms 
is unrelated to stock market)112. There were found merger waves for listed firms in all three areas 
tested (US, UK and Continental Europe) although in different time periods (US from 1996 till 
2000, UK from 1995 till 2001, Continental Europe from 1999 till 2001) and there was no 
evidence of merger waves of unlisted firms in any area113. This evidence supports the soundness 
of behavioral theories what is also proved by testing impact of the weighted average of P/E on 
merger activity measured by the assets acquired relative to the acquirer’s total assets. There was 
found a negative effect of weighted average of P/E for unlisted firms and a positive effect with 
greater significance for listed companies (also predicted by behavioral theories)114.  
The further evidence is provided by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) supporting behavioral 
theories. It was found that acquirers are priced higher than targets whereas large market to book 
ratio of equity is highly attributable to firm-specific error by acquirers suggesting that acquirers 
are more misvalued and also overvalued. These firms tend to buy less overvalued firms what 
supports behavioral theories115. Testing q-theory by means of effect of Q dispersion suggests that 
it can explain some of merger activity. However, when the sample is divided into two groups, 
low valuation and high valuation periods, the effect of Q dispersion is significant only in low 
valuation period. This fact leads to support of misvaluation theory instead of q-theory116. Further 
industry shocks theory was tested. The industry shocks theory can explain less of the merger 
activity at sector level than misvaluation theory (7% compared to 15%) and although 40% of the 
total dollar volume of merger activity happens during periods of economic shocks the highly 
overvalued bidders are responsible for 65% of merger activity117. Therefore behavioral theories 
have more explanatory power than other theories when examining merger waves.  
 
4. M&A Regulation in the European Union 
 
In the 1985, the European Commission came with the initiative of the development of 
Single European Market to sustain the economic expansion at the level of the American market. 
Afterwards in 1987 the Single European Act came into force and its main objective was to 
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gradually prepare legislation before the 1992’s establishment of the single market118. The firms 
started to prepare themselves for the single market’s arrival through the rising amount of cross-
border mergers hence the effective regulation of mergers was needed119. In December 1989, the 
Council Regulation (EEC) Merger Control was passed and came into force in September 
1990120. The European Commission intervenes in the cases of transactions which are defined as 
“concentration” in Article 3 of the Regulation 4064/89 and have a “Community dimension” as 
defined in Article 1. The concentration arises as defined in Article 3 where:  
“(a) two or more previously independent undertakings merge, or 
  (b) one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or 
- one or more undertakings 
acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means, 
direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 
[...] The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to coordination of the competitive 
behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint venture, shall 
constitute a concentration.“ 
 This means that mergers, acquisitions of control (fully or partially) and full-function 
joint ventures are subject to the overview of the Regulation when they are also exceedig the  
threshold of Community dimension which scope is defined in Article 1 and it is scored if:  
„(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
ECU121 5 000 million, and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than ECU 250 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.“ 
 Through the implementation of the merger control on the European level the importance 
of national competition authorities was reduced. In June 1997, the regulation amending the 
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previous one was passed and came into force in March 1998122. The important change was in the 
definition of Community dimension in that way there was added the second threshold to the 
previous one mentioned above, hence a concentration has a Community dimension when: 
“(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
EUR 2 500 million; 
 (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; 
 (c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and 
 (d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than EUR 100 million; 
 unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.” 
 
 This definition also includes the firms which are originally not from the Member states 
but their turnover is sufficiently high in the European Union. Therefore some of the transactions 
are subject to the other jurisdiction than just the European Commission Regulation. The well-
known case of the combination of two US companies Generic Electric and Honeywell is the 
good example of different perception of the competition legislation’s enforcement. The proposed 
merger was approved by the US authorities but was banned by the European Commission due to 
its establishment of dominant position in the market through vertical integration (i.e. the market 
strength of General Electric in the market for leasing service can be used to “leverage” market 
strength of Honeywell in the supplying of airlines) and bundling (i.e. General Electric could 
make the sale of its avionics and non-avionics products dependent on the buying of related 
Honeywell’s engines)123,124.   
 Currently the Regulation from the year 2004 is in the force125 where the process of 
examination of undertakings is described. Transactions which meet the definitions of 
concentrations and have a Community dimension are according to Article 4 obliged to notify to 
the Commission before their implementation. After the Commission has obtained complete 
notification it has 25 working days to decide if the transaction falls into the scope of the 
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Regulation and whether it is compatible with the common market. The possible outcomes of this 
first phase are defined in Article 6 and they are summarized as followed: 
• Art.6.1.a: the transaction does not fall in scope of the Regulation therefore it has not to be 
reviewed 
• Art.6.1.b: the transaction falls in scope of the Regulation but it is compatible with the 
common market therefore no need for the review of the case 
• Art.6.1.c: the transaction falls in scope of the Regulation and it raises serious doubts 
about compatibility with common market, followed by the initiation of proceedings  
• Art.6.2: the transaction follows the modification in order to diminish doubts about 
compatibility with the common market 
 
If the transaction falls into scope of the Article 6.1.c the decision shall be taken within 90 
working days (Art.10.3) after the initiation of proceedings. At the end of this phase, the 
Commission can decide in the following ways as defined in Article 8: 
• Art.8.1: the transaction is declared compatible since it would not significantly impede 
effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it as defined in 
Art.2.2 
• Art.8.2: the transaction is declared compatible after the modification leading to the 
advanced effective competition 
• Art.8.3: the transaction is declared incompatible with the common market since it would 
significantly impede effective competition in the common market as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position as defined in Art.2.3 
The investigation of the European Commission after 1990 concentrated on the 
prohibition of transactions which create or strengthen a dominant position as defined in Art.2.3 
of the Regulation No 4064/89 and after 2004 on transactions which significantly impede effective 
competition as defined in Art.2.3 of the Regulation No 139/2004. This change should enable the 
challenge of mergers with multi-firm unilateral effects126. However, the amount of the initiated 
proceedings has not risen substantially after 2004. Further, from statistics of EC Merger 
Regulation till May 2012 can be seen that about 88% of all notified cases were compatible with 
the common market or out of scope of the Regulation. Only 55.5% of the cases in the second 
phase were declared compatible with commitments (i.e. modification is needed to be 
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undertaken). Finally, there were only 22 cases that were prohibited by the European 
Commission127.  
The effectiveness of merger control decision in the EU was assessed by Duso et al. 
(2011). They found out that the remedies in merger control decisions were increasingly used 
both in the EU and the US. However, from 2001 till 2003 the prohibitions have been intense in 
the US unlike in the EU128. The effectiveness of merger control is measured by the negative 
relationship between decision cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and announcement 
CAARs which is induced by the assumption that anticompetitive returns (e.g. the increased 
market share) generated by merger around the merger announcement should be decreased by the 
authority decision. On the overall, remedies are only partially effective with the higher 
effectiveness when the anticompetitive concerns are not too severe and when they are applied in 
the first investigation phase rather than in the second one129. Interestingly, the probability of 
prohibition or the use of remedies is significantly negatively correlated when the one or both 
merging firms are from the US and on the contrary the probability of action significantly rises 
when there are vertical or conglomerate concerns, with the size of rival firms and when the firms 
operate in manufacturing130. 
The overview of the EC merger control showed that the need for regulation evolved with 
the time and the increased amount of M&A deals. The number of prohibited transactions persists 
low since there is the trend of deregulation and increasing trust for efficient markets. However, 
the efficiency of merger control stays uncertain and the increasing use of remedies may not be 
effective especially in the case of complex deals.  
 
5. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
5.1. Relevant literature 
 
This section overviews the literature connected to the empirical research in this work 
with emphasis on the recent literature and points out the gaps in the standing M&A literature. 
The most important and interesting works are discussed in detail. 
Firstly, the literature confirmed the industry clustering in the merger activity (Harford 
(2005), Andrade, Stafford (2004)) suggesting the specific industries constitute the majority of the 
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M&A activity. For example, Mitchell, Mulherin (1996) lists which industries specifically were 
responsible for the takeover activity, the most active sectors during time period of 1993-1994 in 
the US were banking & finance, broadcasting & communications and leisure & entertainment131. 
However, the explanation of the M&A activity is supported rather by the broad industry shocks 
than by specific industry shocks such as deregulation, energy dependence, import vulnerability 
and R&D/sales when considering explanatory power132. The industry shocks, as the determinant 
of M&A activity, are also confirmed in other papers especially the ones trying to explain merger 
waves (Harford (2005), Andrade, Stafford (2004), Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)). Nevertheless, the 
research neglects the individual characteristics of industries as the measure of industry clustering 
or merger wave.  
Secondly, the research seems to dispraise the various types of mergers, namely 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. Often it is not distinguished among them 
(Harford (2005)) or there is simplified differentiation only between mergers within an industry 
and mergers between different industries (Andrade et al. (2001), Andrade, Stafford (2004), 
Bernile at al. (2007)) suggesting that to vertical and conglomerate mergers is not devoted enough 
consideration.  The study of Fan, Goyal (2006) investigated vertical mergers and found that 
vertical merger activity was intense in 1980s and 1990s and leaded to positive wealth effects 
surpassing the conglomerate mergers along with being comparable to horizontal mergers133. 
Further, vertical mergers do not cluster in a specific set of industries but they are apparent in 
different individual industries such as medical and transportation equipment in 1990s134.  
Thirdly, the recent literature dedicates research to the specific industries and their M&A 
activity. Muehlfeld et al. (2011) showed that the majority of cases happened within food 
processing industry i.e. vastly characterization of industry by horizontal mergers leading to 
increasing concentration in this industry135. Rhéaume, Bhabra (2008) found that five traditional 
information industries (communications, publishing, computing, entertainment and electronics) 
engage more in related acquisitions i.e. horizontal M&A than unrelated acquisitions in contrary 
to the expectation that due to the technological uncertainty the unrelated M&A would 
dominate136. The most interesting results showed the study by Madura et al. (2012). They found 
that merger premiums are larger when industry is characterized by higher industry concentration, 
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intensive research and development expenses and smaller dispersion of Tobin’s q137. They 
looked also on the industries individually (namely banks, other financials, transportation and 
communications, retail trade, manufacturing, services and mining) and found out that merger 
premiums vary substantially across the industries for example mean premium for services was 
41% and for mining only 28%138. Interestingly manufacturing industries, which scored the third 
best merger premium, were characterized by the largest amount of R&D and ranked the second 
in industry concentration confirming the positive impact of R&D and industry concentration on 
merger premiums.  
Andrade et al. (2001) have made one of the most important and extensive empirical study 
about mergers. They focused on two facts; that mergers occur in waves and clustering by 
industry in merger activity. The research was made on the US based firms (both acquirer and 
target) which are listed on important American stock exchange markets (NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ)139. The three major merger waves were confirmed; 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. In the 
1960s there were far more deals than in 1980s but in dollar terms 1980s the deals were much 
bigger. The 1990s period was even more dramatic with large number of deals and large value140. 
Other interesting fact is that there is the rise in the share of horizontal mergers (defined at 2-digit 
SIC code) from 1970s till 1990s (from 29.9% to 47.8% out of all mergers)141. Clustering of 
industries was identified by assessment of top five industries ranked by merger value for each 
decade; in 1990s the most active industries were metal mining, media and telecommunication, 
banking, real estate and hotels. It is notable that most prevalent industries differ from decade to 
decade (especially in 1980s and 1990s)142. The existence of merger waves and their different 
composition in terms of industries suggest that merger activity may occur due to industry level 
shocks as technological shocks, supply shocks and deregulation. This fact was tested by means 
of identification of deregulation event. After determination of the industries having undergone 
deregulation the deregulation window was defined (three years before the event and six years 
after). The findings were consistent with clustering of industries where banking and 
telecommunications were deregulated and belonged to the most active industries in 1990s. The 
contribution of deregulated industries in total deal volume rose substantially after 1988 to the 
half of the deals and it remained higher than in period before this year143.  
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The further study of Andrade and Stafford (2004) investigates the role of M&A and 
internal corporate investment at the industry and firm levels. The firm’s intention to grow and 
expand can be facilitated by mergers or internal corporate investment and the firm should decide 
between these ways wisely by considering their net benefits144. Further, the mergers can have 
two roles; expansionary and contractionary. The expansion can take a form of industry-wide one 
when firms try to increase their size and scale. The contraction happens when mergers occur 
within one industry what leads to removed duplicate functions and rationalized operations. 
Therefore the research explores the occurrence of the both types of mergers over time and 
industries and also determinants of mergers and internal corporate investment145. The sample 
consists of mergers between CRPS-listed firms between 1970 and 1994 when controlling interest 
(more then 50%) of the firm is acquired146. The strong merger activity’s clustering over the time 
of acquirer’s industry was registered, 50% of the industry’s merger activity occurred within 5 
year sub-period147. The clustering for internal capital investment was not proved. Results showed 
that mergers within an industry and diversifying mergers (i.e. merger between firms in different 
industries) are not correlated (i.e. they are different in their process and determinants) and 
particularly that own-industry mergers (i.e. horizontal mergers) affect the whole industry and 
they are induced by industry shocks and excess capacity148. Further, the acquirers in horizontal 
mergers are better performers (they have higher cash flows, higher q, more debt capacity) and 
these mergers have potential of the greatest gains149. The study confirms previous findings of 
positive effect of deregulation on merger activity and that mergers after 1990 are motivated by 
the expansion and optimism of industries’ performance. 
The industry-wide economic shocks are considered as one of the reasons for merging. 
Bernile et al. (2007) examined one of these shocks- how industry demand shock affects firms’ 
strategic incentives to merge horizontally. The proposed model predicts that in two extreme 
periods, industry’s expansion and industry’s recession, the decision of the incumbents to merge 
does not have a great impact on entry decision of potential entrants therefore the incumbents 
decide to merge because of the increased post-merger profits. In the expansion potential entrants 
profit from high value of entry option and in the recession they have no incentive to enter 
regardless of the incumbents’ decision to merge. On the other hand, in intermediate states the 
incumbents deter entry by not merging since a horizontal merger leads to the reduced 
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competitiveness of industry, one of the incentives to enter for potential entrants. The empirical 
analysis on the US based deals from 1981 till 2004 showed that there were 12,269 horizontal 
mergers (both bidder and target operated in the same Fama-French industry150) in the sample151, 
almost 58% of all completed mergers. As the most active industries appeared candy and soda, 
healthcare, shipbuilding and railroad equipment, coal and banking. The most active years were 
the years 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000152. These findings confirm merger waves and industry 
clustering in merger activity. Furthermore, the results of empirical research affirmed the 
proposed model. The relation between merger intensities (dependent variable) and demand 
shocks measured by the median annual sales growth within the industry for each year 
(independent variable) is examined through regression to confirm U-shaped relationship, i.e. 
positive coefficient on squared sales growth and negative coefficient on sales growth153. On the 
sample of horizontal mergers the U-shaped relation is highly statistically significant and 
economically meaningful. On the other hand, conglomerate mergers (i.e. the difference between 
all completed mergers and horizontal mergers) are not influenced by the industry demand 
shocks154. Further, the relation is confirmed on the subsample of relatively concentrated 
industries measured both by high Herfindahl indexes and above-median number of firms (not 
confirmed on the subsample of competitive industries)155. To other interesting results belongs 
that deregulatory event has positive impact on horizontal merger intensity and negative influence 
on conglomerate mergers although these relations are not statistically significant and economic 
shock appears to have higher impact on relatively competitive industries than on concentrated 
industries acknowledged by increased coefficient and significance156. Overall, the evidence 
supports the view that firms engage more in horizontal mergers during periods of positive and 
negative demand shocks157 and strategic motives are important by firm’s decision to undergo 
merger158. However, this research distinguishes only between horizontal and conglomerate 
mergers and does not mention vertical mergers. It would be interesting to see the relation 
between vertical merger intensity and industry demand shock.   
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5.2. Hypotheses 
 
In this section the formulation of hypotheses connected to the research questions and the 
previous literature is presented. The research is constructed in order to answer question “Do the 
different M&A types cluster by specific industries?”. The previous literature showed that there is 
evidence that merger activity clusters by industries (Harford (2005); Andrade, Stafford (2004)) 
but less consideration was dedicated to the fact if they cluster also according to the M&A types 
i.e. if horizontal (or vertical or conglomerate) M&A are characterized by specific industries. It is 
assumed that clustering will be confirmed also in the relationship to the different merger types 
therefore the second important question is “Which characteristics of industries have effect on the 
occurrence of specific M&A types?”. This question is connected to motives of merger activity 
and also theories of merger waves. From that the four important industry characteristics are 
explored in connection with the existing theory: overvaluation of assets, asset specificity, 
industry deregulation and industry concentration. Hypotheses cover all types of M&A in order to 
fill in a gap in literature with consistent research. In the end the control hypothesis, which is not 
connected to the industry characteristics, is formulated in order to see if there can be also other 
determinants of M&A types besides industries’ characteristics.  
The empirical research in this thesis covers the fifth wave which was mainly 
characterized by mega deals all over the world not just in the US. The M&A activity was 
motivated particularly by deregulation trend, technological changes and the positive situation on 
the capital market. In order to confirm if these motives really were present for the researched 
sample are formulated various hypotheses. Generally, the dominance of horizontal mergers over 
vertical and conglomerate mergers is to be expected and their ratio will rise over the years as it 
was documented in Andrade et al. (2001)159. This is also influenced by the fact that horizontal 
mergers have the greatest potential to increase the performance of the combined firm either 
through the operating synergies and the reaping of the larger market share. Vertical mergers can 
manage to achieve synergies of vertical integration since the firms avoid the costly negotiations 
regarding their supplier-buyer contracts. Conglomerate mergers are motivated by the 
diversification and risk reduction which are not always the most advantageous motives and the 
potential for the growth of combined firm is constrained. This discussion leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Horizontal mergers will occur most frequently, then vertical mergers will 
follow and finally conglomerate mergers will occur least often. Sub hypothesis 1a: The 
occurrence of horizontal mergers will rise over the years.  
 
One of the most reliable theories explaining the merger waves the overvalued shares 
theory (Shleifer, Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf, Viswanathan (2004), Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005)) suggests that in the time of the optimism in the stock market the amount of M&A is 
increasing. The managers of overvalued firms tend to engage in acquisitions to benefit from the 
positive situation. Target firms have to access the misvaluation due the positive market situation 
and the possible synergy flowing out of the merger in the decision process of accepting the offer. 
Further, the M&A between firms in the same industry tend to occur more in overvalued sectors 
and M&A between firms in different industries will be characterized by the acquirer from 
overvalued sector and target from relatively undervalued sector160. This means that horizontal 
mergers should occur more often in overvalued sectors and on the other hand, vertical and 
conglomerate mergers should occur between overvalued and undervalued sectors. However, the 
misvaluation can be considered as the dubious motive for M&A since there could come to the 
overestimation of the own stock’s overvaluation and subsequent lower performance of the 
combined firm than anticipated. Especially, in the case of conglomerate merger there might be 
higher estimation error since it happens between two unrelated firms and they do not posses 
enough information about each other. Therefore, the positive development on the capital market 
should be not the only motive justifying the deal and other considerations should be taken in 
account. From the discussion in this paragraph the consequent hypothesis can be specified: 
Hypothesis 2: Horizontal mergers will occur more often in the overvalued sectors than in 
the undervalued sectors. Sub hypothesis 2a: Vertical and conglomerate mergers will occur more 
often between the overvalued and undervalued sectors. 
 
According to the transaction cost approach (Coase (1937), Williamson (1971)) the firm 
has to face different transaction costs when it does not provide inputs within the firm. Obtaining 
of the goods and service through the market can be costly due to searching and information costs 
(i.e. to find the firm to deal with and determine on which terms it wants deal), negotiation and 
bargaining costs; the costs of formulating of the contract and afterwards enforcement costs161. 
Further the contracts might consist of restrictive limits which need to be followed and the 
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supplier desires the long-term contracts due to risk avoidance what may be not beneficial for the 
acquirer since he will lose some of the flexibility162. Therefore it is natural that the firms want to 
engage in vertical integration i.e. organize internally not only because of operating synergies but 
also the external market might not be efficient due to the transactional costs163. This is especially 
true when the firm deals with highly specific assets and it is harder to find the trustable supplier 
who will be willing to invest in specialized capital and sustain the long-term relationship164. In 
the case of high asset specificity it is very beneficial for the firm to organize internally because 
of the accessibility of economies of scale165. The expediency of vertical integration increases 
when both firms engaging in the transaction rely on specific assets. As the measure for the asset 
specificity the amount of the research and development (R&D) can be used and it should have a 
positive influence on vertical integration166. Shelanski and Klein (1995) lists also other empirical 
studies which used R&D as the proxy for the asset specificity and other possible measures such 
as complexity, worker-specific knowledge or physical proximity167. Following this thinking 
when vertical M&A are considered as the proxy for vertical integration the following hypothesis 
can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: The occurrence of vertical mergers will be higher if acquirer or target is 
R&D intensive. Sub hypothesis 3a: The even higher occurrence of vertical mergers will be 
observable if the both acquirer and target are R&D intensive.   
 
One of the theories explaining the merger waves lists deregulation as the main 
determinant of them. Harford (2005) found out positive and strongly significant influence of 
deregulation on the beginning of the wave along with economic shock and capital liquidity168. 
Empirical study was made on the US mergers but similar results can be expected for the 
European ones. Further, Andrade and Stafford (2004) confirmed the positive effect of 
deregulation on merger activity. The main motive driving the firms is the strategic realignment to 
the regulatory change i.e. the external motivation and we could see this driving force mainly 
during the fifth wave from 1993 till 2000 and also by the last wave since there is the trend to 
continuous deregulation; in the EU it is the move to the Single Market also supported by 
competition policy. The important was also the transfer from the third wave to the fourth wave. 
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The third wave was characterized by the large amount of conglomerate M&A due to the strict 
antitrust regulation and less developed external markets. On the contrary, the fourth wave was 
characterized by the relaxation of the antitrust policies and the evolution of efficient capital 
markets what leaded to the divestitures in conglomerate mergers and the return to specialization, 
i.e. horizontal mergers. Therefore the deregulation can be held also as the main factor of the 
transfer from diversification to the specialization. Further, in the previous study it was found that 
deregulation event has positive impact on occurrence of horizontal mergers but not on the 
conglomerate mergers169. The following consistent hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 4: The occurrence of mergers will increase in the affected industries after 
deregulatory event. Sub hypothesis 4a: The occurrence of horizontal mergers will increase more 
than the occurrence of conglomerate mergers in the affected industries after deregulatory event. 
 
One of the important drivers for the mergers is the need for the market power. With that 
is connected the concentration on the market which is indeed the result of the allocation of 
market power. Firstly, the market power is in some extent motive for horizontal mergers. This 
was the case in the first wave and leaded to increased concentration on the market. Also it raised 
antitrust concerns what leads us to the assumption that it is easier for firms to engage in 
horizontal mergers in the competitive markets because they can increase their market share 
without competition authorities’ action. On the other hand, if the vertical or conglomerate 
mergers are motivated by the increase in the market power there must be one important 
presumption in order to properly achieve it, the concentration on the market. If these types were 
undertaken in the competitive market there would be not substantial effect on their market 
power; in order to reach the market they have to be rather pursued in oligopolistically structured 
market170 i.e. less competitive markets. There are also other reasons why in less competitive 
market it is better to engage in vertical mergers. Firstly, it is the possibility of the market 
foreclosure which leads to the increased market share of the engaging firms and subsequently 
augmented profits. Basically, it means if two suppliers merge and they decide to supply inputs 
only to its downstream division there is less competition prevailing for the rest of the suppliers 
and they can increase their prices. For downstream firms the prices of inputs are increase hence 
their costs are augmented and they are forced to increase their prices for the final consumers. The 
merged company does not face the increased input prices and therefore they can increase their 
market share on the final market by sustaining the lower prices what in the end effect means they 
                                                 
169 Bernile et al. (2007), p.46 
170 Stewart et al. (1984), p.297 
 41 
have higher profits than non-merging firms171. This positive effect of market foreclosure is even 
more positive when the original setting on the market is less-competitive. Further, if the 
downstream firms are perfect substitutes i.e. market concentration is low and the upstream firms 
engage in the monopoly or there is only one supplier i.e. high market concentration the vertical 
integration leads to the maximized profits. This holds because the integrated upstream and 
downstream firm forecloses the rest of the downstream firms which are forced to leave market 
and the remaining firm yields the whole profit172 (vice versa it holds that vertical integration 
occurs from the more competitive upstream firms to less competitive downstream firms173). 
Therefore the vertical integration is more advantageous if it takes place between less competitive 
firms and highly competitive firms. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The occurrence of the vertical and conglomerate mergers will be higher 
than occurrence of the horizontal mergers if they will be undertaken between less competitive 
industries. Sub hypothesis 5a: The occurrence of vertical mergers will be even higher if these 
mergers will be undertaken between less competitive and more competitive industries.   
 
Each type of merger is characterized by the different level of industry relatedness due to 
the combination of engaging industries. Horizontal mergers occur within the same industry 
therefore the acquirer and the target posses the same industry characteristics174. However, 
vertical and conglomerate mergers are undertaken between different industries and their 
characteristics might differ. Although these differences, which constitute the unrelated 
diversification, decrease the performance of the combined firm this negative outcome can be 
mitigated by the reaching of economies of scope. The economies of scope are likely to be largest 
when they occur between R&D intensive firms175. Further, conglomerate mergers are more 
motivated by diversification and risk reduction than by market power motive as it is the case of 
horizontal mergers hence the occurrence of conglomerate mergers might not depend on the 
relatedness of industry concentration176. This reasoning holds for the vertical177 and 
conglomerate mergers but since the conglomerate mergers are characterized by higher level of 
unrelated diversification and are motivated by less rational motives there should be a difference 
between these two types of mergers. Conglomerate deals should be undertaken between firms 
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characterized by the higher differences in underlying industry characteristics than the vertical 
mergers especially when regarding the level of asset specificity. On the other hand, since vertical 
mergers should occur more often between high and low concentration industries conglomerate 
mergers should follow this pattern less often (same reasoning is applied to level of valuation). 
Concluding from the discussion the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 6: Conglomerate mergers will occur between firms with greater level of 
difference in industry characteristics in terms of R&D intensity than vertical mergers. Sub 
hypothesis 6a: Conglomerate mergers will occur more often between the industries with 
comparable level of concentration and valuation. 
 
The following paragraph discusses the relationship between the type of M&A and the 
type of strategic combination according to the degree of integration and control. The firms 
engage in various deals in order to reach the desired level of control and integration. For 
example, when the low level of control or integration is needed to increase the performance the 
firms engage in minority ownership, on the other hand sometimes the full integration is 
necessary then the majority ownership is applied. Generally, it can be stated that if the firm 
wants to maximize the gain from merger, when there is benefit from realizing the synergy and 
the price is right, it should acquire the whole target178. However sometimes partial acquisitions 
can be more beneficial than full acquisitions, especially in the case if the acquisition price is too 
high and the realized synergies are low179. Horizontal transactions have the greatest potential for 
realizing the synergies; net wealth gains are significantly higher for related mergers rather than 
for conglomerate mergers180. This suggests that since horizontal mergers produce more synergies 
there will be higher incentive to engage in full acquisitions although the acquisition price is high. 
Further vertical and conglomerate mergers are connected with higher coordination costs due to 
the substantial differences between merging firms therefore it is beneficial for them to engage in 
partial acquisitions which do not require the costly full integration. The specific consideration is 
connected with joint ventures suggesting that horizontal JVs are synergy orientated181 and 
vertical JVs are oriented as complexity and uncertainty avoiding182.  Vertical JVs have 
significantly higher positive valuation effects than horizontal JVs (but only 2.02% when 
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measured by mean excess return)183. Finally, the greater the asset specificity it is more beneficial 
for firms to underwrite the full contract184  suggesting the positive relationship between R&D 
intensive industries and the type of strategic combination. This discussion is concentrating on the 
possible relationship between the type of merger and the type of strategic combination. Its aim is 
to control the other effects besides the impact of the industry characteristics on the type of 
merger. The following hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hypothesis 7: The highly integrated type of deals will be more characterized by 
horizontal M&A and on the other hand, the less integrated type of deals will be more 
characterized by vertical and conglomerate M&A. Sub hypothesis 7a: There will be more 
vertical JVs than other types of JVs. Sub hypothesis 7b: The industries with highly specific assets 
will engage more in the highly integrated type of deal.  
 
Theoretical part of the thesis was closed by formulating hypotheses. In the empirical part 
the data will be described and how the hypotheses were measured. Afterwards the results of the 
research will be presented and the hypotheses will be confirmed or rejected with subsequent 
discussion of implications on the M&A activity and further research.  
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
6.1. Data 
For the research the data from the public domain DOME Database were used. The 
acronym DOME stands for Database on Mergers in Europe compiled at the Kiel Institute for 
World Economics. Its current version consists of merger cases under examination by the 
European Commission since 1990 until December 31st, 2000. The database includes various 
information about 1515 cases like the date of the announcement, information about acquiring 
company, target and the selling company as well as the transaction value (if disclosed). The other 
important information is classification of deal (majority ownership, joint venture, minority 
ownership and pure merger) since all these deals leaded to indirect control of the company and 
were notified at the European Commission as merger cases. Furthermore some notes are also 
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given like methods of payment, the further development after the merger and possible reasons 
for the transaction as additional information185.  
The European Union controls and regulates mergers through the European Commission 
Directorate-General for Competition. Not all business cases are reviewed by the European 
Commission, only merger cases exceeding specific threshold i.e. Community dimension need to 
be notified and then examined by the control organ (see the section of M&A regulation in the 
EU). The regulation leads to the fact that in the merger database the large transaction mergers are 
over-represented however these undertakings are one of the most important cases with strong 
effect on the market. The second consideration about data is that sample consists mainly of 
companies from large European countries although the acquirers companies are also from the US 
and Switzerland186. On the other hand, this enables the exploring of the undertakings in the same 
environment avoiding the differences in the way of doing business.  
 In the research it was focused on information about buyer and target companies, 
especially in which sectors they are/were operating. Many cases involved more than one 
acquiring company; in this case industry sectors for all acquirers were taken in account in 
defining the type of merger. DOME database has taken information on sectors of concerned 
companies either from the European Commission or the Worldscope database which compiles 
annual report data of large corporations to provide coherent information about their business and 
key financial ratios. However, companies, which do not exist as an independent legal unit, are 
removed from Worldscope database187 therefore there were some merger cases in the DOME 
database where the sector information about buyer and target companies was missing. In these 
cases I used various internet sources with help of the company name to find out the sector of its 
business. As additional information the classification of deal (majority ownership, joint venture 
etc) was observed to examine if this characteristics has some impact on occurrence of horizontal, 
vertical and conglomerate undertakings between companies. 
 The first step was to determine the type of M&A (i.e. horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate type) for each case. In the literature it is often used the simplified distinguishing 
between these types when horizontal M&A is held as the principal type and other transactions 
are not further differentiated into vertical and conglomerate types. For example, Andrade et al. 
(2001) defined own industry deals (i.e. both parties are operating in the same industry defined at 
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2-digit SIC code level188) and Bernile et al. (2007) distinguished between horizontal merger (i.e. 
the bidder and target are operating in the same Fama-French189 industry190) and conglomerate 
merger (i.e. other deals). The identification of vertical M&A type seems to be the most 
problematic. Fan, Goyal (2006) constructed the framework measuring vertical integration 
through input-output linkages. For each pair of industries i and j, the dollar value of industry i’s 
output required to produce one dollar’s worth of industry j’s output was computed, afterwards 
the same calculation was made conversely (i.e. industry i’s input requirement of industry j’s 
output) and the maximum of these coefficients was taken as the opportunity measure for vertical 
integration between the pair of industries191. Mergers were classified as vertical if this 
opportunity coefficient was greater than 5% respectively 1%192. Alternatively, vertical 
relationship can be classified subjectively on the basis of the accessible information and the 
nature of the firms as it was done in Johnson, Houston (2000). In the research the similar 
principles to input-output linkages were used. Horizontal merger was observed when both 
acquirer and target were from the same industry and if there were more acquiring companies all 
of them had to correspond to target’s industry. For the detecting vertical merger the symmetric 
input-output table at basic prices including domestic output and imports for the year 2000 in the 
Euro area compiled at Eurostat was used193 including classification of sector data used in DOME 
database to the right NACE category used by Eurostat. The data from 2000 were used for the 
whole sample since data from the previous years are not accessible but this relationship between 
industries is assumed to be stable over time and regions (i.e. table for the European Union 27 
member states showed similar relationship without great differences at the selected cutoff). 
Vertical linkage between industries A and B was detected if the input of industry A contributed 
more than 5% to the total input of products needed for production of industry B (the same is 
valid vice versa i.e. if industry A utilizes in its production input of industry B counting for more 
than 5% of total inputs needed). Some of the industries have many vertical linkages such as 
construction (vertical linkages with 25 other sectors) or business service (vertical linkages with 
13 other sectors). On the contrary, some industries have a small potential for engaging in vertical 
merger and they concentrate on business within its own industry such as agriculture and wood 
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sectors which have vertical linkages only with 2 other sectors194. The vertical merger occurred if 
it encompasses firms in sectors with vertical linkage and if there were more acquirers all of the 
firms have to incorporate vertical linkages among them (i.e. firm A’s industry has to be vertical 
integrated with firm B and C’s industry and at the same time firm B’s industry must be vertical 
related to firm C’s industry). Lastly, all other deals, which are not classified as horizontal or 
vertical, are categorized as conglomerate M&A. Special category in classifying the type of deal 
constituted three sectors: conglomerate, holding and investment holding. The main 
characteristics of firms involved in these sectors is that they encompass different firms possibly 
from different industries therefore the special regard has to be paid to categorization of such 
deals. In the case of deal occurrence between these specific sectors, also in the case of 
simultaneous appearing of more than one of these sectors in the case of the deal with more 
acquirers, and other sector or sectors these cases are classified as vertical deals (in the case of the 
deal with more acquirers all other sectors must be vertical related to be classified as vertical 
M&A). However, these deals could be  also categorized as horizontal if conglomerate or holding 
encompasses a firm in the same industry like the combining firm (due to the high amount of 
these deals it is not possible to check each deal individually).  
 The next consideration in the research was paid to the calculation of occurrences of 
individual industries according to the type of M&A. Horizontal mergers involved the firms in 
one industry hence for each case of horizontal deal one occurrence for the appertaining industry 
was scored. In the case of vertical or conglomerate merger the firms are operating in different 
industries. When transaction was made between two firms for both firm’s industries the one 
occurrence was scored. In the case of deal with more acquirers for each different industry one 
occurrence was counted e.g. if two acquirers were operating in the same industry the occurrence 
for this industry was calculated only once. This way both acquirer’s and target’s industries  were 
taken into account and for each case the assignment of specific industry to particular type of 
M&A was reached.  
 The data about characteristics of industries in order to test the formulated hypotheses 
were collected from various sources. This part constituted the most difficult one since the most 
of data are collected on the firm-level and there is less information on industry-level which is 
important in order to form conclusions for M&A types’ characterization by industries. The 
further problem represented the accessibility of data e.g. for specific time period or the lack of 
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collecting of needed data by the European Union. Hence in the research it was attempted to use 
the most appropriate data occasionally with applying of the simplifying assumptions.  
 The first step was to determine the overvalued and undervalued sectors. The conventional 
measure for misvaluation is market-to-book ratio (M/B) and it was used in Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005) or in Harford (2005). Market-to-book ratio, also called price-to-book ratio (PBV), is 
calculated by dividing the market value of equity by the book value of equity. If PBV is less than 
one it means that a firm is trading for less than its book value. This suggests that a firm is 
undervalued what can lead to two conclusions of investors, either the firm represents a good 
investment opportunity or there is fundamentally something wrong with the firm. Further the 
higher PBV means that the firm is more overvalued. When deciding which firm to acquire it is 
important to look on its individual valuation and performance but also how it is doing in 
comparison to its competitors and industry in which it is operating. Individual information about 
the firm can be taken from its annual report, financial statement or specialized business sites 
dedicated to investment research (e.g. Bloomberg). Information on industry-level is usually 
formed by computing the industry averages by taking into account individual firm information of 
firms operating in industry. Source of various valuation measures on industry-level is calculated 
and publicized by Aswath Damodaran, Professor of Finance at the Stern School of Business at 
New York University who wrote important books on equity valuation and corporate finance195. 
The data are updated regularly and they are available for several markets such as the US, Europe 
and Japan. For the US market there are recent data sets and also data from previous years. 
Unfortunately, for the European market there are data on industry-level only for recent period 
therefore for calculation of industry average of PBV the data on firm-level from year 2002 (the 
oldest available data set for European market) was taken196. Firstly, calculation required the 
matching of industry sectors used by Damodaran to industries used in DOME database. 
Damodaran used more specific sectors in comparison to DOME database therefore often 
industry defined by DOME database included more industries defined by Damodaran e.g. 
chemicals industry included Damodaran’s chemicals-diversified, chemicals-fibers, chemicals-
other and chemicals-specialty sectors. Secondly, since the data set provided data on individual 
firms the industry average needed to be calculated. By computing the industry average it is 
important to take into account the relative firm size to other firms in industry therefore as the 
proxy for firm size its sales was used (the information was included in the data set) since it is one 
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of the most common measures for firm size which is not biased by accounting manipulation197. 
Afterwards the weighted average of PBV per industry when considering firm size was 
calculated: 
                         
                           for n firms i belonging to specific industry 
 
After calculating the industry averages for year 2002 they were compared to actual averages for 
European market from year 2011. The values are similar for the majority of industries and show 
significant medium correlation (further if the values are distributed to five categories more than 
50% of industries are in the same category for two periods) although Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test198 proved that values for time periods are significantly different from each other, PBV 
average was significantly higher (Mdn= 1.76) in year 2002 than in year 2011 (Mdn= 1.58), T= 
657.5, p< .05, r= -0.28199. However, the difference in medians is not very high and effect size is 
only medium. The significant difference can be caused by the more exact calculation of industry 
averages of PBV in year 2002 by looking on individual firms (for year 2011 industries averages 
were available) and the fact in year 2002 industries were more overvalued on the overall than in 
2011. The table with PBV for each industry can be seen in Appendix B.2. and in Table 4 can be 
seen the classification of industries according to their PBV in 2002.  
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Industries categories according to their valuation 
Undervalued Low overvalued Low-medium 
overvalued 
Medium 
overvalued 
Highly 
overvalued 
PBV ≤ 1 1<PBV≤2 2<PBV≤3 3<PBV≤4 PBV>4 
agriculture 
airline 
detergent business  
investment holding 
mining 
wood 
automobile 
aviation 
banking 
catering trade 
chemicals  
construction 
defence 
distribution 
distribution durables 
distribution non-
durables 
electronics  
electronics/IT 
Hardware 
finance 
furniture 
health / computers 
industrial machinery 
insurance 
oil 
packaging  
paper  
plastics 
primary metal 
industries  
real estate 
recycling 
retail 
stone, clay, glass etc 
telecommunication 
travel 
utilities 
apparel and fabric products 
business services 
computers 
consultancy 
engineering 
entertainment 
environmental reclamation 
industrial manufacturing 
measuring instruments etc 
optics 
post 
publishing 
service 
transportation 
waste management 
 
cosmetics 
food 
leather 
non-food retail 
software 
tobacco 
transport 
equipment 
 
advertising 
health 
pharmaceuticals 
renting 
textile 
Table 4: Categories of industries according to their EU PBV 2002 
 
 The next firm characteristic is its R&D intensity which can be held as the proxy for asset 
specificity200. On the firm-level it can be measured by ratio of R&D expenditures to sales i.e. the 
higher ratio means that the firm possesses more specific assets. On the industry-level the OECD 
classification according to technological intensity can be used. This classification takes into 
account direct and indirect R&D intensity. Direct R&D intensity measures production of 
technology i.e. the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added or production and indirect R&D 
intensity measures use of technology i.e. the ratio of R&D expenditures plus technology 
embodied in intermediates and capital goods to production201. Sectoral classification for 
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manufacturing industries distinguishes four groups: 1.) high technology, 2.) medium-high 
technology, 3.) medium-low technology and 4.) low technology. The list of industries classified 
according to technological intensity updated in 2001 can be seen in Appendix B.3.. However, 
this classification overviews only manufacturing industries and there are also service sectors 
which use high technology intensively. Therefore OECD lists also “knowledge-intensive” 
services sectors since its introduction in 2001 STI Scoreboard. This classification similarly takes 
into account direct and indirect R&D expenditures and additionally to manufacturing industries 
workforce skills. The listed knowledge intensive sectors are post and telecommunications, 
finance and insurance and business activities not including real estate. Alternatively, for some 
countries education and health sectors are added202,203.  The knowledge intensive industries are 
considered as one of the R&D intensive industries in the research since workforce skills 
represents highly specific asset of firms. After matching industries classification used by OECD 
(ISIC Rev.3) to industries used in DOME database the list of industries according to the R&D 
intensity was created as it can be seen in Table 5.  
Technology level Industries 
Low-technology 
Apparel and fabric products, textile, leather 
Food, tobacco 
Furniture 
Industrial manufacturing 
Paper, publishing, wood 
Recycling 
Medium-low 
technology 
Oil 
Plastics 
Primary metal industries 
Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 
Medium-high 
technology 
Automobile 
Electronics, electronics/IT hardware 
Chemicals, cosmetics, detergent business 
Industrial machinery 
Transport equipment 
High technology 
Aviation 
Pharmaceuticals 
Computers 
Telecommunications 
Measuring instruments, photographic goods, clocks; optics 
Knowledge-intensive 
Finance, insurance, banking 
Business services, service, consultancy, engineering, software, 
renting 
Post, health 
Table 5: OECD classification based on R&D intensity adapted to DOME industries 
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 The next step is to identify the deregulation events in the European Union in specific 
industries and their corresponding years of implementation. The European Union in attempt of 
unification of member states’ markets into single European market in order to increase 
competitiveness of the whole union has been gradually introducing directions aimed on 
consolidation of individual laws. These directions influenced mainly industries which were 
protected by national laws and their competitiveness was restricted. As the main deregulated 
industries in the EU during 1990s were identified air transport, banking, insurance, 
telecommunications and utilities. In the US, almost the same industries were deregulated 
although the years of implementation of deregulation are different204. The reason for incremental 
differences between the US and European deregulation policies is that the EU is attempting to 
align its own policies with the US ones in order to sustain the competitiveness of the European 
firms vis-à-vis the US firms. In the next paragraphs the deregulation of different sectors is 
discussed in details and afterwards the Table 6 summarizes the deregulation events.  
 Air transport was gradually liberalized as the response to the US airline deregulation in 
1970s in order to increase competitiveness of the European airlines towards the US airlines. The 
deregulation proceeded through three packages of regulations. The first package applicable since 
1988 was aimed mainly on limitation of strict competition rules implied by Article 85 of EC 
Treaty which prohibits all agreements between undertakings affecting trade between member 
states. As the result agreements between air transport firms objecting at achieving technical 
improvements and cooperation were allowed205. The second package came into force in 1990 
aimed primarily on air fares liberalization206 and market access207. The first two packages 
contributed only incrementally to the promotion of competition therefore the third most 
important package was adopted in 1992 and implemented in 1993. Firstly, the transparent and 
non-discriminatory rules for obtaining license for air carriers within the EU was formulated with 
allowance to operate air carriers without obligation to own their own aircraft208. The second 
regulation aimed on provision of market access for European-based air carriers within the EU 
and before 1997 member states shall authorize cabotage traffic rights and shall not discriminate 
the air carriers from other member states209.  Finally, the third regulation aimed on free setting of 
air fares by air carriers operating within the EU210. These regulations contributed to the creation 
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of single market for air transport removing the national rules by the year 1997 and enhanced 
international competitiveness of European air transport industry. Deregulation of air transport 
shall have the great impact on merger activity of airline industry after 1993 and afterwards in 
1997.  
 Telecommunications industry was mainly operated as state monopoly in Europe till 
1980s and was monitored on the member state level. The liberalization of telecommunications 
was inevitable in Europe in order to ensure competitiveness of Europe towards the US which had 
opened up some of its markets a decade ago. The first step to liberalization constituted the 
adoption of the “1987 Green Paper” by the European Commission which aim was the 
strengthening of European telecommunications through regulatory adjustments and the achieving 
of the Single market211. The actual deregulation was reached by the series of Commission 
Directives. In 1988, the first directive abolished special or exclusive rights granted by member 
state in terminal equipment market212 in order to ensure the profiting from the technological 
advances through a free choice for customer. The subsequent directives prescribed the opening-
up of different telecommunications markets: data services by the end of the year 1992213, satellite 
communications by 1994214, mobile communications by 1996215 and voice telephony services by 
1998216. The deregulation enabled full competition in telecommunications’ markets and the 
creation of the single market by the beginning of the year 1998.  
 Banking sector was also deregulated as the part of transformation to the single European 
market.  The single market requires free movement of capital which was based on three 
principles set by the 1985 White Paper: harmonization of rules (e.g. authorization and financial 
supervision), mutual recognition among regulatory authorities from different member states and 
home country control (i.e. supervising of the financial institution by its member state of 
origin)217.  The first step to actual deregulation of banking sector was provided by the First 
Banking Directive of 1977 (this Directive comprises also other credit institutions such as 
insurance institutions) which aim was to eliminate differences between laws of member states. 
The important aspects of the directive were the principle of non-discrimination i.e. bank wishing 
to operate in one member state and having the head office in other member state shall underlie 
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the same authorization process as home-based banks218 and the host-country supervision i.e. 
member state grants authorization to banks when underlying conditions are complied219 and 
monitors the liquidity and solvency of banks220. However, the directive was not sufficient and 
banking sector remained highly regulated and had small potential for competitiveness. The more 
important was the Second Banking Directive of 1989 which objective was the granting of a 
single license recognized through the EU. Banks were not longer a subject to host-country 
supervision and the principle of home country control was introduced i.e. the supervision of 
banks is the responsibility of home country authorities221. The directive came into force in 1990 
and its provisions (e.g. own funds and solvency ratio of credit institutions) have to be followed 
latest by the beginning of the year 1993222. The liberalization brought along with deregulated 
interest rates and removed capital controls by member states regulatory environment promoting 
free entry of foreign banks and competition in the industry223. The deregulation accommodated 
the base for the increased M&A activity in banking sector.  
 Insurance sector was gradually liberalized on the basis of the major EU principles i.e. the 
freedom of movement of capital, the freedom of establishment and the freedom of movement of 
services224 through three generations of insurance directives. The first generation of insurance 
directives was issued in 1970s and enabled the European-based insurance firms to expand into 
member state’s market with only permission of local authority. The second generations of 
directives came into force in 1988 and 1990 and the European firms gained permission to operate 
in member state without having to establish its own branch there. However, many restrictions 
persisted and directives were insufficient to establish free movement of services225. The most 
important deregulation was reached by the third generation of insurance directives. This was 
provided by Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance and Council Directive 
92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct life insurance which came into force in July 1994. The main aim of 
these directives was to decrease state intervention to minimum through three principles: the 
single European license (i.e. the European based insurer can operate within the EU on the base of 
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authorization in the home member state without additional permissions of host country226), the 
home country control (i.e. the financial supervision of the insurer is the sole responsibility of its 
home member state227) and the solvency supervision (i.e. the previous substantive supervision 
was replaced by solvency supervision228 including verification of state of solvency, of the 
establishment of technical provisions and of the assets covering the insurers229). As the main 
deregulatory event in insurance industry can be held these directives and they should be followed 
by the increased M&A activity in this sector. 
 One of objectives of single market was to establish single internal market in energy in the 
EU, specifically in the electricity sector. The main aim was to reduce costs, maintain 
competition, increase of security and quality of electricity supply in order to guarantee optimal 
energy supply for all citizens of the EU230. The second important objective was to eliminate 
substantial price discrimination among consumers through the EU through transparency. 
Therefore the first phase of deregulation of electricity sector was implemented by two directives 
in 1991. The first one was focused on the improvement of gas and electricity prices charged to 
industrial end-users which shall be reached by improved transparency i.e. the publication of the 
price systems and consumer consumption categories231. The consumers could freely choose 
between different energy sources and different suppliers in order to ensure themselves acceptable 
prices paid for energy. The second directive obliged member states to facilitate transit of 
electricity between high-voltage grids based on non-discriminatory conditions232. The second 
phase of deregulation was crucial to ensure deregulation by member states in order to establish 
internal energy market providing the reinforcement of security of electricity supply the 
competitiveness of the European economy233. In 1997 firstly, the generation of electricity was 
deregulated by allowing of new entrants to construct new generating capacity on non-
discriminatory base when member state authorizes them or chooses them through tendering 
process234. Afterwards transmission and distribution of electricity was gradually deregulated by 
taking in account the extent of share of electricity consumed. In 1999, the electricity market 
affecting consumers with consumption more than 40 GWh per year was opened, in 2000 the 
threshold was decreased to 20 GWh per year and finally in 2003, it was decreased to 9 GWh per 
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year235. By year 2000, 30% of the electricity market was opened up236 what constituted a 
possibility of the increase of M&A activity in utility sector. The deregulation of energy sector is 
planned to progress till 2014237. 
Industry deregulated Deregulating directives and regulations 
Year of 
implementation 
Air transport Council Regulation 2407/92  
Council Regulation 2408/92  
Council Regulation 2409/92 
1993 and 1997 
 
Telecommunications Commission Directive 88/301 
Commission Directive 90/388 
Commission Directive 94/46 
Commission Directive 96/2 
Commission Directive 96/19 
 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
Banking Second Council Directive 89/646 1993 
Insurance Commission Directive 92/49 
Commission Directive 92/96 
1994 
Utilities Directive 96/92 1999 
Table 6: Overview of deregulated industries 
 
 Typical measures for the concentration of industries developed in industrial organization 
theory are Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and concentration ratios238. HHI is the sum of the 
squares of market shares (si) of all firms i in the industry:  
 
HHI’s values vary between 0 and 1, where 0 stands for perfect competition and 1 stands for 
monopoly hence the more close to 1 means the more concentrated industry. The measure takes 
into account both the absolute number of firms in the industry and the size distribution of firms. 
HHI is mainly used by the US merger guidelines where it is scaled by 10,000 since the market 
shares are calculated as percentages. Alternatively, the concentration ratios are used as the 
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measure for the concentration of industries. The concentration ratio is calculated as the sum of 
the market shares of the largest m firms (when firms are ordered by market share si in descending 
order):  
 
Usually, four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) or eight-firm concentration ratio (CR8) are used in 
praxis (virtually all numbers of firms can be used). The concentration ratios do not take into 
account the variation of firm size i.e. industry with equal sized firms can have the same CR4 as 
industry with the excessively largest firm.  
 In the US the concentration ratios as well as HHI are published by Economic Census239 
every 5 years. However, there is no such census for the firms in the European market hence 
alternative sources for these data were used. Industrial organization theory predicts the 
relationship between industrial concentration and the size of the market i.e. if the size of the 
market is increased e.g. due to elimination of trade barriers the number of entrants will rise, the 
competition will become fiercer and concentration will be lower. Further, Shaked and Sutton 
(1987) explored the relationship between the level of endogenous fixed costs (R&D and 
advertising) and industrial concentration. There are two main implications of the models 
proposed in the paper. Firstly, an increase in the market size by industries producing 
homogenous products will lead to a fragmented industry (less concentrated industry) where the 
market shares of firms are decreased240. Secondly, an increase in the size of the market by 
industries producing higher quality products (vertically differentiated products) will not lead to a 
fragmented industry but to a concentrated industry with higher fixed costs driving better quality 
of products241. These propositions were tested empirically and confirmed by Robinson, Chiang 
(1996) and Lyons et al. (2001). The work of Lyons et al. (2001) brought the great insight in the 
relationship of concentration and the level of endogenous fixed costs and was used as the base 
for the identification of the level of industry concentration. They distinguish between two types 
of industries similarly as Schmalensee (1992): type 1 industries which produce homogenous 
products and type 2 industries for which are important endogenous fixed costs (R&D and 
advertising). Further, they defined three categories for type 2 industries: type 2A industries 
engaging greatly in advertising and not R&D, type 2R industries engaging in R&D but not in 
                                                 
239 http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html#, accessed on 8.7.2012 
240 Shaked, Sutton (1987), p.134 
241 Shaked, Sutton (1987), p.140 
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advertising and type 2AR industries which are both advertising and R&D intensive242. The higher 
concentration levels are predicted to be observed when moving from industry type 1 to 2A to 2R 
and 2AR. The proposition was tested on the European manufacturing firms and afterwards 
compared to the US firms and firms from Big 4 (Germany, France, the UK and Italy). It was 
proved on all geographic levels (despite the differences in means among them) that concentration 
measured by mean CR4 is rising from industry type 1 to 2A to 2R and 2AR
243 leading to 
classification of industry concentration levels. Type 1 industries are classified as industries with 
low concentration, type 2A are industries with low-medium concentration, type 2R industries are 
characterized by medium concentration and the highest concentration is provable for type 2AR 
industries. The overview of industries classified according to types244 is transformed for the 
industries used in the research245. For the selected manufacturing industries the data from the US 
1997 Economic Census were collected, specifically HHI and CR4
246
 and the corresponding mean 
CR4 (arithmetic average) for different types of industries were calculated and compared to the 
European data which are taken from Lyons et al. (2001). In Table 7, the comparison of the mean 
CR4 in the Europe and the US showed only little differences proving the earlier findings that the 
concentration industry levels for different industries tend to be similar across various 
countries247. Further, it was looked on the most concentrated EU industries in 1987 as found in 
Davies, Lyons (1996). The industries belonging to the 20 most concentrated EU industries 
measured by CR5 are labeled as MC in Table 8. Overall, the most concentrated industries 
corresponded to industries classified as high concentration industries omitting only 
pharmaceuticals (labeled as MC). Three of medium concentrated industries (aviation, electronics 
and chemicals) belonged to most concentrated industries what can be caused by different 
concentration measures CR4 contrary to CR5. Surprisingly, tobacco sector which is classified as 
having low-medium concentration was among the most concentrated industries (labeled as MC) 
and CR4 value from the US also suggests high concentration therefore it was not considered in 
calculation of mean CR4 for the US data. In the research, the classification of industry 
concentration levels are used and alternatively they will be corrected (industries labeled MC will 
be allocated to high concentration group of industries) by taking into account findings in Davies, 
Lyons (1996) to see if the correction will have a positive effect on confirming the hypotheses. 
                                                 
242 Lyons et al. (2001), p.4 
243 Lyons et al. (2001), p.12 
244 Lyons et al. (2001), pp. 21-22 
245 See Table 8 
246 Source: http://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html#, accessed on 8.7.2012 
247 Sutton (1991), p.111 
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Industry type Concentration level European mean CR4 US mean CR4 
Type 1 
Type 2A 
Type 2R 
Type 2AR 
Low concentration 
Low-medium concentration 
Medium concentration 
High concentration 
12,2 
18 
28,3 
40 
12,49 
18,23 
26,54 
48,54 
Table 7: The comparison of the mean CR4 
 
HHI CR4
furniture type 1 low concentration 55,5 11,2
leather type 1 low concentration 167,2 19
paper type 1 low concentration 173,3 18,5
plastics type 1 low concentration 30,2 8,2
primary metal industries type 1 low concentration 97,4 13,8
publishing type 1 low concentration 38,4 9,6
stone, clay, glass and concrete products type 1 low concentration 52,1 9,1
wood type 1 low concentration 52,7 10,5
apparel and fabric products type 2A low-medium concentration 100,6 17,6
food type 2A low-medium concentration 91 14,3
textile type 2A low-medium concentration 186,2 22,8
tobacco type 2A low-medium concentration no data 89 MC
aviation type 2R medium concentration 1638,9 62,3 MC
electronics type 2R medium concentration 105,9 14,8 MC
chemicals type 2R medium concentration 76,6 11,9 MC
industrial machinery type 2R medium concentration 89,4 13,5
industrial manufacturing type 2R medium concentration 89,4 13,5
measuring instruments, photographic goods, clocks type 2R medium concentration 137,5 16,3
mining type 2R medium concentration no data no data
telecommunication type 2R medium concentration no data 31,9
transport equipment type 2R medium concentration 563,3 37,9
automobile type 2AR high concentration 2505,8 82,4 MC
computers type 2AR high concentration 464,9 37 MC
detergent business type 2AR high concentration 1618,6 65,6 MC
optics type 2AR high concentration 263,2 25,4 MC
pharmaceuticals type 2AR high concentration 446,3 32,3
CorrectionIndustry Type Concentration level
US concentration 1997
 
Table 8: Classification of industries according to concentration level 
 
 From the DOME database were collected data about classification of deal for each case. 
There were identified seven types: joint control, majority control, sole control, joint venture, 
minority ownership, majority ownership and merger. These combinations differ in the degree of 
integration and control e.g. minority ownership suggests the acquisition of less than 50% of 
shares in the firm leading to lower control as in the case of majority ownership where more than 
50% of shares are acquired. The deals can be ordered by the degree of control and integration 
from joint ventures, which are formed for specific project and firms stay independent, to mergers 
which require full integration of firms. The Figure 2 shows the sequence of strategic 
combinations. 
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Figure 2: Sequence of strategic combinations 
  
After collecting all data about merger cases and industries’ characteristics the appropriate 
statistical tests in SPSS were executed to test the formulated hypotheses248. The emphasis was 
laid on the relationship between specific industries’ characteristics and the occurrence of types of 
mergers (i.e. horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers). Most of data were categorical; 
either nominal as in the case of type of merger or ordinal when the data can be ranked in order as 
in the case of level of technology and only PBV represents metric data. Therefore mostly chi-
square test was used since the formulated hypotheses did not require to form and test complex 
model. Table 9 lists the variables used in the research and their description. For testing the 
relationship between acquirers and targets (required by some formulated sub hypotheses) the 
same information about target’s industry characteristics (i.e. level of technology, concentration, 
PBV and PBV category) was collected. 
Variable Description Scale 
Sector 
 
Industry in which acquirer or target was/is operating 
 
Nominal 
 
TypeMerger 
 
Type of merger (horizontal, vertical or conglomerate) 
 
Nominal 
 
Classification Classification of deal (joint venture, minority ownership, 
majority ownership, merger) 
Ordinal 
Year Year of deal (from 1990 to 2000) Ordinal 
Technology Technology level of industry (low-technology, medium-low-
technology, medium-high-technology, knowledge-intensive, 
high-technology) 
Ordinal 
Concentration Concentration of industry (low, low-medium, medium and high 
concentration) 
Ordinal 
PBV Average PBV of industry in 2002 Metric 
PBV_category Category of industry according to its EU PBV 2002 
(undervalued; low, low-medium, medium, highly overvalued) 
Ordinal 
Table 9: Overview of variables used in the research 
 
                                                 
248 The help of Field (2005) was used by choosing the statistical tests and reporting the results 
 
Joint venture 
Joint control 
 
Minority 
ownership 
Majority ownership 
Majority control 
Merger 
Sole control 
Degree of control 
Degree of integration Low High 
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6.2. Results 
 
This section represents the most important part of this thesis i.e. the presentation of 
empirical research’s results. The emphasis is laid on the testing of formulated hypotheses in 
order to draw conclusions about an influence of industry’s characteristics on the engaging in 
specific type of M&A.  
 In the beginning, it was essential to answer the first research question “Do the different 
M&A types cluster by specific industry?”. The question was tested by chi square test between 
variables sector and merger type. On overall, there were 70 different industry sectors engaging in 
M&A (together 2215 cases). However, some of industries did not undertake enough M&A in 
order to fulfill assumptions of chi square test i.e. the expected frequencies should be greater than 
5. Therefore industries with less and equal 15 occurrences (since there were three categories of 
merger types) were excluded by this test. On overall, 33 industries were excluded accounting for 
154 cases. The highly significant result of chi square statistics proved that there is an association 
between industry sector and type of merger. The medium association (computed by Cramer’s 
statistics 0.344 at p< .001) suggests that there is different pattern in characterization of industry 
by merger type looking on different sectors. Therefore the first research question can be 
answered positively i.e. different M&A types cluster by specific industries and more formally, 
there was a significant association between type of merger and industry sector χ2 (70)= 487.056, 
p< .001249.  
On overall, the most active industries in M&A deals (measured by total count of 
occurrences by sector) are banking, telecommunications, chemicals, automobile and electronics. 
The result is similar to Andrade et al. (2001) where telecommunications and banking also 
belonged to the most active industries in M&A activity. From Table 10 it can be seen that 
telecommunications, chemicals and automobile sectors are mainly characterized by horizontal 
type of mergers. On the other hand, electronics is mostly characterized by conglomerate mergers 
and banking is almost evenly split into all three M&A types. 
Further, according to contingency table the industries are characterized by different M&A 
types and top five industries for each merger type are identified (measured by the percentage of 
merger type within sector, i.e. the percentage of total occurrences recorded by industry 
appertaining to the individual merger type250) and can be seen in Table 11. Industries 
conglomerate and investment holding are not considered in table since due to the calculation of 
                                                 
249 Contingency table and the underlying SPSS output can be seen in Appendix C.2. 
250 Alternatively, it can be measured by sector’s percentage within type of merger. However, in this case mostly the 
most active industries appear in all three types of merger. 
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occurrences they are mostly classed as vertical mergers (more than 80% of their occurrences are 
assigned to vertical merger type). In general, it can be pointed out that services industries are 
more characterized by vertical mergers (e.g. real estate, software and finance) and on the other 
hand, industries from primary sector of economy and manufacturing are more characterized by 
horizontal mergers (e.g. food; paper; stone, clay, glass and concrete products and primary metal 
industries). Interestingly, finance sector is mainly characterized by vertical and conglomerate 
mergers and only incrementally by horizontal deals. This can be caused by the fact that firms in 
finance sector are engaging in mergers as an intermediation for financing a merger deal between 
other industries. 
Sector  Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate Total 
banking Count 
% within sector 
% within type of merger 
62 
39% 
7.4% 
52 
32.7% 
8.2% 
45 
28.3% 
7.7% 
159 
100% 
7.7% 
telecommunications Count 
% within sector 
% within type of merger 
73 
48.7% 
8.7% 
37 
24.7% 
5.8% 
40 
26.7% 
6.8% 
150 
100% 
7.3% 
chemicals Count 
% within sector 
% within type of merger 
57 
43.8% 
6.8% 
43 
33.1% 
6.8% 
30 
23.1% 
5.1% 
130 
100% 
6.3% 
automobile Count 
% within sector 
% within type of merger 
53 
46.9% 
6.3% 
17 
15% 
2.7% 
43 
38.1% 
7.3% 
113 
100% 
5.5% 
electronics Count 
% within sector 
% within type of merger 
31 
28.7% 
3.7% 
31 
28.7% 
4.9% 
46 
42.6% 
7.8% 
108 
100% 
5.2% 
Table 10: Overview of most active industries in M&A 
 
Horizontal type Vertical type Conglomerate type 
1. Food (73.2%) 1. Real estate (61.1%) 1. Transport equipment (66.7%) 
2. Paper (69%) 2. Software (50%) 2. Engineering (55.6%) 
3. Insurance (66.7%) 3. Finance (42.2%) 3. Distribution durables (51.7%) 
4. Stone, clay, glass and 
concrete products (61.3%) 
4. Defense (41.7%) 4. Finance (48.4%) 
5. Primary metal industries 
(60.6%) 
5. Plastics (39.4%) 5. Service (45.5%) 
Table 11: Top five industries in categories of merger types 
  
Furthermore, the testing of formulated hypotheses is presented. The main aim of testing is  
answering of the second research question „Which characteristics of industries have effect on the 
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occurrence of specific M&A types?“. Through confirming (or rejecting) of hypotheses the better 
understanding of industry characterization by merger types will be enabled. 
 
 
 The first hypothesis aims at demonstrating how often specific merger types occur in 
general and how they grow over time. From 1990 till 2000 there were 1488 deals (initial 1515 
cases recorded in DOME database were reduced by cases which did not enable classifying of 
industry) from which there were 884 horizontal, 332 vertical and 272 conglomerate transactions. 
On overall, horizontal deals accounted for almost 60% followed by vertical mergers accounting 
for 22.3% and at least often occurred conglomerate mergers accounting for 18.3%. Therefore 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed. 
 
 
 Over the years, total number of M&A has risen from 9 deals in 1990 to its peak 390 deals 
in year 2000. All three merger type grew almost steadily through years as it can be seen in Figure 
3. Number of horizontal deals decreased only in two cases, in year 1993 and 1999. On the other 
hand, conglomerate deals remained almost at the same level of activity since 1994 till 1997 and 
afterwards their occurrence rose dramatically in 2000. Occurrences of vertical mergers seem to 
follow almost the same pattern as occurrences of horizontal deals (there was a strong positive 
correlation between number of occurrences of vertical and horizontal transactions over years, r= 
0.945 at p< .001).  
 In order to correctly consider the growth of number of horizontal deals over the years it is 
important to look besides absolute numbers on relative percentages of occurrences in comparison 
to other merger types. Over time period, the percentage of horizontal merger within year always 
dominated vertical and conglomerate deals, fluctuating from the highest share 79.7% in year 
1992 to the lowest one 49.5% in 2000. However, it can not be argumented that the ratio of 
horizontal transactions over other two merger types is constantly rising over the years. 
Interestingly, the percentage of vertical type in year fluctuates arround 21% and the percentage 
of conglomerate type fluctuated arround 17% in time period 1994-1999. Major change happened 
in the peak year 2000 when the ratio of horizontal mergers decreased by almost 10% and the 
ratio of vertical and conglomerate deals increased (by vertical type about 3% and by 
conglomerate type about 6%). The possible explanation of changed situation in 2000 is the great 
growth of M&A deals‘ amount in order to exploit the positive situation on the market wihout 
Hypothesis 1: Horizontal mergers will occur most frequently, then vertical mergers will 
follow and finally conglomerate mergers will occur least often. 
Sub hypothesis 1a: The occurrence of horizontal mergers will rise over the years. 
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necessary consideration by choosing the most advantageous type of merger. In Table 12 the 
evolution of absolute and relative occurrence of different merger types can be seen. 
 
 
Figure 3: Graph of different merger type occurrences over years 
  
Sub hypothesis 1a can be partly confirmed. Looking on the absolute number of 
occurrences by horizontal mergers there can be seen a steady growth over time period. However, 
the amount of mergers (all types) was rising over the years not only the amount of horizontal 
deals. Looking on the percentage of occurrences within individual years by horizontal deals it 
can be concluded that the ratio of horizontal mergers over other merger types fluctuated and was 
not steadily rising. However, horizontal mergers dominated other two merger types through all 
researched years. 
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Table 12: Occurrence of merger types over time period 1990-2000 
 
 
 
The valuation of sectors is provided in the research by two variables: PBV as value of 
average PBV of sector or valuation categories of sector. The first variable enables to compare the 
mean PBV of horizontal deals with other merger types. On the other hand, looking on the 
relationship between valuation categories of sectors and merger types will show the relative 
occurrence of horizontal deals within undervalued and overvalued sectors.  
 Generally, the industries with PBV lower than 1 are considered as undervalued and with 
PBV higher than 1 as overvalued. There are only a few undervalued sectors in comparison to the 
overvalued ones however the level of overvaluation differs for individual industries251. Looking 
on Table 13 it can be seen that horizontal deals occur at least often (measured by percentage 
                                                 
251 See Table 4 
Hypothesis 2: Horizontal mergers will occur more often in the overvalued sectors than in the 
undervalued sectors. 
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within category of valuation) in undervalued sectors, only 18.5% compared to vertical type 
accounting for 60% and conglomerate deals accounting for 21.5%. For overvalued sectors, 
horizontal deals accounted for 43.19% what represents 24.69% growth compared to undervalued 
sectors. Furthermore, within all categories of overvalued sectors horizontal deals represented the 
highest share of occurrences. The share of horizontal deals fluctuated only little (on average by 
6%) in categories of overvalued sectors and for medium overvalued industries horizontal 
transactions dominated other two merger types; they accounted for 51.1%. Interestingly, the 
industry mostly characterized by horizontal deals, the food industry, is assigned to medium-high 
overvalued category what confirms the second hypothesis (other industries from top five 
characterized by horizontal mergers are in low-overvalued category; this does not contradict the 
second hypothesis since they all are overvalued though only lowly). It is notable that most 
mergers happened in low-overvalued category. This is caused by the high amount of industries 
assigned to this category and also that all of the most active industries are in this category (i.e. 
banking, telecommunication, chemicals, automobile and electronics). Hence it does not make 
sense to look on the percentages of different valuation categories within merger type because of 
highly unevenly distributed sectors. In order to overcome this problem the relationship between 
average PBV (continuous data) and merger type was examined. 
The examination of relationship between PBV and merger type was done by comparing 
means of each merger type through the Kruskal-Wallis test since PBV does not represent a 
normal distributed data (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed for all merger types that they are 
different from normal at p< .001). Firstly, average PBV was significantly affected by merger 
type (H(2)= 12.96, p< .01). Mann-Whitney tests were used as post-hoc test to compare different 
merger types. A Bonferroni correction was applied (since there were made two comparisons to 
horizontal type: firstly compared to vertical type, secondly compared to conglomerate type; the 
critical value of significance is .05/2= .025) and all effects are reported at a .025 level of 
significance. It appeared that PBV was not significantly different by vertical type compared to 
horizontal type (U= 252396.00, r= -.04). However, PBV was significantly higher by 
conglomerate type when compared to horizontal type (U= 254329.50, r= -.06) however the 
effect size is very small252.  
                                                 
252 SPSS output can be seen in Appendix C.3. 
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Table 13: Cross-table of merger type and valuation category of sectors 
 
However, looking on the relationship between PBV and type of merger does not show if 
horizontal mergers occur more often between overvalued sectors than undervalued sectors. Test 
indicated that there are differences between PBV across different merger types and especially 
between horizontal and conglomerate mergers. This suggests that conglomerate mergers occur 
more often between more overvalued sectors what will be also discussed by the next sub 
hypothesis. 
 From the previous presentation of results it can be concluded that looking on relationship 
between categories of industry valuation and merger type confirmed that horizontal mergers 
occur more often between overvalued than undervalued sectors in terms of absolute occurrences 
and also relative occurrence to other two merger types. 
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Table 13 in the previous discussion presented the share of different merger types in 
individual valuation categories of industries. Generally, the undervalued sectors were mostly 
characterized by vertical mergers (60%) followed by conglomerate deals (21.5%). The 
overvalued sectors were more characterized by horizontal mergers (43.2%), then by 
conglomerate mergers (30.2%) and finally by vertical ones (26.6%). However, this does not 
indicate if the vertical and conglomerate mergers occurred between undervalued and overvalued 
sectors. Therefore, the relationship between valuation categories of acquirer and target industry 
need to be examined (this was not needed by horizontal mergers since they occur between the 
same industries therefore between the same valuation categories). For simplification, into 
account are taken two combinations between industries: 1.) deal between undervalued acquirer 
(target) and overvalued target (acquirer) and 2.) deal between overvalued (undervalued) acquirer 
and overvalued (undervalued) target. Table 14 shows that if merger happens between 
undervalued and overvalued company it is much more characterized by vertical mergers 78.1% 
(measured by the percentage within combination of sectors) than by conglomerate mergers 
accounting for 21.9%. However, the majority of mergers happened between sectors which are 
the same in valuation (i.e. between two overvalued firms or between two undervalued firms what 
happened only in 6 cases); in the case of vertical merger it was 78.2% (measured by percentage 
within merger type) and by conglomerate mergers it was even higher 94%.  
 
Table 14: Cross-table between merger type and combination of sectors 
Sub hypothesis 2a: Vertical and conglomerate mergers will occur more often between the 
overvalued and undervalued sectors. 
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Furthermore there was found a significant association between combination of sectors’ 
valuation and whether merger was vertical or conglomerate χ2(1) = 27.64, p< .001. Besides the 
calculated odds ratio suggests that when deal happens between undervalued and overvalued firm 
it is 4.37 times more likely to be vertical merger than conglomerate merger253.  
From the results it can be concluded that only vertical mergers occur more often between 
undervalued and overvalued sectors what is confirmed mainly by the cross-table and the 
underlying statistics. Conglomerate mergers tend to happen mostly between overvalued firms 
what was confirmed by Table 14 and also by general numbers from the previous table where 
undervalued sectors were less characterized by conglomerate deals mainly in comparison to 
vertical mergers. Therefore the sub hypothesis 2a is confirmed only partly for vertical mergers.  
 
 
 
 According to the third hypothesis R&D intensive industries should be more characterized 
by vertical mergers than other two merger types. The most R&D intensive industries according 
to OECD should be high technology industries. Furthermore knowledge-intensive industries 
represent industries with high specific asset, knowledge. Therefore these industries should show 
the highest share of vertical mergers in their occurrences. However, only two of these industries 
have the highest share of vertical mergers, these are software (50%) and business services 
(35.1%, however conglomerate mergers have the same share). Further, finance sector is the one 
of top five industries characterized by vertical mergers although the highest share in the 
occurrences of this industry has conglomerate merger type. For the majority of the high 
technology and knowledge-intensive industries vertical mergers scored the second highest share 
in occurrences although by aviation and computers vertical mergers occur at least often.  
 Besides looking on individual R&D intensive industries it is important to examine how 
the share of vertical mergers varies in different categories of industries’ technology levels. 
According to Table 15 all industries’ technology levels demonstrate the highest share of 
horizontal mergers (measured by percentage within technology). However, this is caused by the 
fact that horizontal deals occur at most often. Hence, it is important to look on vertical mergers 
alone and it can be seen that most of the vertical mergers happened in knowledge-intensive 
industries accounting for 36.3% of the overall amount of vertical mergers (measured by 
percentage within type of merger). The second highest share among vertical mergers belongs to 
                                                 
253 See Appendix C.4. 
Hypothesis 3: The occurrence of vertical mergers will be higher if acquirer or target is R&D 
intensive. 
 69 
medium-high technology industries (27.6%) followed by high technology industries (16.7%). 
This argument confirms the third hypothesis. 
 
Table 15: Cross-table of relationship between merger type and industry's technology level 
  
Furthermore, since technology can be considered as ordinal variable through Kruskal-
Wallis test can be examined if technology level differs by different merger types. It was found 
out that technology level is significantly affected by merger type, i.e. merger type indicates 
industry’s technology level of engaging firm (H(2)= 9.68, p< .01). Mann-Whitney test were used 
to examine if vertical mergers indicate the higher level of technology of engaging firms in 
comparison to horizontal and conglomerate deals. A Bonferroni correction was applied so all 
effects are reported at a .025 significance level. It emerges that technology level of engaging 
firms was no different by vertical and conglomerate merger type (U= 90174.5, r= -.02). 
However, technology level of engaging firms was significantly higher by vertical mergers than 
by horizontal deals (U= 124400.5, r= -.08) although effect size is very small254.  
 From the previous discussion of results it can be concluded that the most of vertical 
mergers occur in higher technology industries, i.e. knowledge-intensive, medium-high 
technology and high technology industries, which are at most R&D intensive. Furthermore, this 
                                                 
254 SPSS output can be seen in Appendix C.5. 
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fact is strongly supported by positive effect of vertical mergers on technology level of engaging 
firms in comparison to horizontal mergers (through Kruskal-Wallis test) which occur at most 
often and seem to be dominating all categories of technology level by number of occurrences. It 
can be concluded that vertical mergers occur more often in R&D intensive industries what 
confirms the third hypothesis.  
 
 
 Sub hypothesis 3a suggests that the majority of vertical mergers should happen between 
R&D intensive acquirer and target. The confirmation of this sub hypothesis will also support 
third hypothesis in the way that it validates the positive effect of R&D intensity on specific 
relationship of target and acquirer. The acquirer and target in this case are R&D intensive if they 
are industries with high technology level or they are knowledge-intensive (alternatively medium-
high technology industries can be considered as R&D intensive however to gain stronger support 
of sub hypothesis only two categories are considered as R&D intensive). Therefore deals 
between high technology (knowledge-intensive) acquirer and target, and deal between high 
technology acquirer (target) and knowledge-intensive target (acquirer) are considered as 
combinations of R&D intensive industries. All other combinations comprise deals between R&D 
non-intensive industries and deals between R&D intensive and R&D non-intensive industries. 
Looking on Table 16 shows that 49.6% of vertical mergers (where by both acquirer and target 
the technology level is identifiable) are between R&D intensive industries. Interestingly, from 
these 69 occurrences 48 cases (69.6%) represent combination between knowledge-intensive 
acquirer and target (accounting for 34.5% of all vertical mergers, the highest share among all 
combinations when all categories of technology levels are analyzed). Furthermore, the 
comparison to conglomerate mergers shows that deals between R&D intensive acquirer and 
target happen more often by vertical merger type (49.6% compared to 24.3%). Also of all 
combinations between R&D intensive industries 67% are vertical mergers (when compared to 
conglomerate mergers, the comparison to horizontal mergers is not done since all of horizontal 
mergers occur between acquirer and target from same technology level category and the previous 
discussion confirmed that significantly higher technology level’s industries are engaging in 
vertical mergers).  
There was found a significant association between combination of R&D intensity of 
acquirer and target and whether merger was vertical or conglomerate χ2(1) = 19.25, p< .001. 
Besides the calculated odds ratio suggests that when deal happens between R&D intensive 
Sub hypothesis 3a: The even higher occurrence of vertical mergers will be observable if the 
both acquirer and target are R&D intensive.   
 71 
acquirer and target it is 3.07 times more likely to be vertical merger than conglomerate 
merger255. 
 
Table 16: Cross-table of relationship between merger type and combinations of R&D intensity 
 
The previous discussion of results suggests there is positive effect on occurrence of 
vertical mergers when both acquirer and target are R&D intensive. This fact brings support also 
to the third hypothesis as well as to sub hypothesis 3a. Although, the percentage of vertical 
mergers when both acquirer and target are R&D intensive is less than 50% the high share of 
49.6% is reached by only combinations between two levels of technology (i.e. 4 combinations of 
levels) in comparison to other combinations which are combinations between three levels of 
technology (i.e. 9 combinations of levels). Also deals between knowledge-intensive acquirer and 
target represent the highest share within vertical mergers (34.5%) and furthermore knowledge-
intensive acquirer engage only in deals with knowledge-intensive or high technology target 
(when technology levels of acquirer and target are identifiable). Therefore it could be concluded 
that sub hypothesis 3a is confirmed and when both acquirer and target are R&D intensive the 
occurrence of vertical merger is highly probable.  
 
 
 
 In section Data of the thesis were identified the industries which were deregulated 
through the time period and the years when deregulatory event occurred (see Table 6). The 
                                                 
255 SPSS output can be seen in Appendix C.6. 
Hypothesis 4: The occurrence of mergers will increase in the affected industries after 
deregulatory event. 
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fourth hypothesis suggests that deregulatory event has a positive effect on number of 
occurrences. Table 17 lists the industries which were deregulated and the occurrence of mergers 
in these industries over the years. The deregulatory events per industry are labeled by grey cells 
in table 17. For comparison the progress of overall amount of mergers over the years is added. 
From table 17 it can be seen that occurrences for each deregulated industry fluctuate heavily256 
and only for telecommunications (after year 1998), airline (after year 1997 incremental increase) 
and utilities there can be stated a constant increase in occurrences (however, for utilities there is 
only one year after deregulatory event therefore this increase may not be reliable). For testing of 
discrete event’s effect it is appropriate to compare the occurrences before event and after event 
through two-sample procedures such as t-test when data are normally distributed (for not 
normally distributed data Mann-Whitney U test is used). This will enable to see if the mean is 
significantly higher after deregulatory event. However, it is important to look if the increase is 
higher than the overall increase of mergers i.e. if the overall number of mergers is rising over the 
years the rise of occurrences after deregulatory event can be due to this fact and not due to the 
deregulatory event.  
Year/sector airline banking insurance utilities telecom. all mergers 
1990 0 1 1 0 0 9 
1991 1 5 1 1 4 62 
1992 3 4 5 0 4 59 
1993 0 9 4 2 4 54 
1994 0 7 13 7 5 87 
1995 1 14 11 4 10 106 
1996 2 8 11 6 14 125 
1997 4 23 9 5 14 147 
1998 5 25 21 12 14 218 
1999 5 21 10 8 21 231 
2000 5 42 19 18 60 390 
Total 26 159 105 63 150 1488 
Table 17: Occurrences over time period in deregulated industries 
                                                 
256 See also Figure 4 
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Figure 4: Occurrences over time period in deregulated industries 
 
For testing the fourth hypothesis, it is inevitable to find out if after deregulatory event 
mean value has increased. In the beginning, the occurrences in deregulated industries were split 
into two sub-samples: before and after deregulatory event (sub-sample of before deregulatory 
event includes the year of deregulatory event). In industries with more deregulatory events were 
chosen specific years: for airline industry year 1997 was taken as the main deregulation event 
and for telecommunications two years were considered 1994 and 1996. Since sub-samples are 
too small to check reliably the normal distribution of their data non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
test was used to compare means of two sub-samples. It can be predicted that mean of after 
deregulatory event’s sub-sample will be higher than mean of before deregulatory event’s sub-
sample therefore it will be looked on one-tailed significance. For all deregulated industries 
besides utilities it was proved that mean after deregulation event is significantly higher than 
before deregulatory event. All statistics are summarized in Table 18 and underlying SPSS output 
can be seen in Appendix C.7.. Noticeably, industries airline and telecommunications (for both 
years) have higher mean after deregulation at higher significance level than banking and 
insurance (p< .01 compared to p< .05).  
Further, it is important to check if the increase in occurrences after deregulation is 
notably high, i.e. compare the growth of overall amount of mergers to growth of occurrences in 
deregulated industries. This will prove that the increase in occurrences is not caused by the 
overall growth of mergers through time period. The comparison is made by the means of 
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estimation of average annual percent change after deregulation by both deregulated industry and 
overall number of mergers (alternatively it can be used by this test comparison of overall percent 
change after deregulation i.e. compare number of occurrences in the last year (2000) to the 
occurrences in year of deregulation; however between year 1999 and 2000 it came to immense 
growth of occurrences therefore this type of comparison might lead to overestimation of growth).  
The average annual percent change after deregulation is calculated as a geometric mean of 
percent changes in deregulated industries since year of deregulation till end year, calculation 
follows as: 
 
where n is the year of deregulation 
k is the end year (2000) 
industry year Mdnbefore Mdnafter U p r 
Airline 1997 1 5 0.00 p< .01 - .75 
Banking 1993 4.5 21 2.00 p<.05 - .68 
Insurance 1994 4 11 4.00 p< .05 - .61 
Utilities 1999 4.5 18 0.00 p> .05 - .48 
Telecom. 1994 
1996 
4 
4 
14 
17.5 
0.00 
1.00 
p< .01 
p< .01 
- .84 
- .75 
Table 18: Summary of statistics for deregulated industries
257
 
 
Table 19 lists the average annual percent changes after deregulation in deregulated industries 
and the respective averages for number of all mergers. Only if the average annual percent change 
after deregulation is higher by deregulated industry than for all mergers for the same time period 
it can be assumed that the growth of occurrences is accountable to other fact (in this case 
deregulation) than just overall trend of increasing number of mergers. However, this was proved 
only by telecommunications for both years of deregulation. Other industries experienced lower 
average annual percentage increase in occurrences than the overall growth of mergers therefore it 
can not be argued that the occurrences after deregulation event have increased due to 
deregulation (utilities industry is not considered since in the previous test did not find that mean 
after deregulation is significantly higher than before deregulation). 
It can be argued that only by telecommunication deregulation had a positive effect on the 
increase in occurrences. Since for other deregulated industries it can not be concluded that 
increase in mean after deregulation is accountable to deregulation rather to overall trend of 
increasing number of mergers the fourth hypothesis can be rejected. 
                                                 
257 In table p is reported for one-tailed exact significance 
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Average annual percent change after deregulation 
Industry Year 
Deregulated industry All mergers 
Airline 1997 7.72% 38.43% 
Banking 1993 24.62% 32.64% 
Insurance 1994 6.53% 28.41% 
Telecommunications 1994 
1996 
51.31% 
43.88% 
28.41% 
32.9% 
Table 19: Overview of average annual percent changes in deregulated industries 
 
 
 
 
 The sub hypothesis 4a suggests that the share of horizontal mergers in occurrences of 
mergers in deregulated industries will be higher in after deregulation sub-sample than in before 
deregulation sub-sample. Further, this share will increase more than the share of conglomerate 
mergers in occurrences of mergers within industry (if the share of conglomerate will be higher in 
after deregulation sub-sample than in before deregulation sub-sample). From Table 20, it can be 
seen by all deregulated industries besides utilities and telecommunication (when 1994 is 
considered as the year of deregulation) that the share of horizontal mergers in the number of 
mergers is decreasing from period before deregulation to period after deregulation (measured by 
% within period). On the other hand, the share of conglomerate mergers increased from period 
before deregulation to period after deregulation by all industries besides utilities. In the case of 
telecommunications when 1994 is taken as the year of deregulation both the share of horizontal 
and conglomerate mergers increased from period before deregulation to period after 
deregulation; however the share of conglomerate mergers rose more (27.8% after deregulation 
compared to 17.6% before deregulation what accounts for difference of 10.2%) than the share of 
horizontal mergers (49.6% after deregulation compared to 41.2% what represents a difference of 
8.4%). Therefore only for utilities industry it can be argued that occurrence of horizontal mergers 
increased more than for conglomerate mergers. However, for utilities there is only one year in 
after deregulation period therefore this fact is not plausible. Furthermore, chi square tests for all 
industries besides banking showed that there is no significant association between period and 
type of merger258.  
                                                 
258 See Appendix C.8. 
Sub hypothesis 4a: The occurrence of horizontal mergers will increase more than the 
occurrence of conglomerate mergers in the affected industries after deregulatory event. 
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 Due to the discussed results it can be concluded that sub hypothesis 4a can be rejected 
since it was not proved that the occurrence of horizontal mergers increased more than the 
occurrence of conglomerate mergers after deregulatory event. The only exception was utilities 
industry but this fact does not support the sub hypothesis reliably.  
 
 
 
 In the beginning of discussion of results it is important to state that as the concentration 
of industry increases the competitiveness of industry is decreasing. Therefore as the proxy for 
competitiveness the concentration of industry is used as it was already discussed in data section 
of this thesis. Looking on individual industries with high concentration it can be seen that they 
are mostly characterized by horizontal deals (when considering automobile, computers and 
pharmaceuticals industries). Only by automobile industry the share of horizontal mergers is less 
than 50% and the share of conglomerate mergers is fairly high (38.1% out of all mergers in 
automobile industry and 7.3% out of all conglomerate mergers what is the third highest share in 
the overall number of conglomerate mergers). However, looking on relationship of merger types 
and categories of industries’ concentration will bring more insight of occurrence’s trend.  
Table 21 presents how occurrences are distributed over categories of industry’s 
concentration and merger types. Noticeably, the highest share within each merger type is 
accounted to medium concentration industries which may be caused by the fact that three out of 
top five active industries in mergers are in this category namely electronics, chemicals and 
telecommunication. Industries with high concentration represent the second highest share out of 
conglomerate mergers accounting for 20.8% (measured by % within type of merger) and the 
third highest share out of horizontal and vertical mergers; accounting for 19.2% by horizontal 
deals and 13.3% by vertical deals. This fact suggests that conglomerate mergers will be at most 
characterized by less competitive industries (more concentrated industries).  
Since concentration of industries can be ranked from the lowest to the highest one, 
through the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests can be examined if vertical and 
conglomerate mergers experienced higher mean in concentration of industries than horizontal 
mergers. It was found that concentration level is significantly affected by merger type, i.e. 
merger type indicates industry’s concentration of engaging firm (H(2)= 6.70, p< .05). Mann-
Whitney tests were used to examine if vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers indicate the 
higher level of concentration of engaging firms in comparison to horizontal deals. A Bonferroni 
Hypothesis 5: The occurrence of the vertical and conglomerate mergers will be higher than 
occurrence of the horizontal mergers if they will be undertaken between less competitive 
industries. 
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Table 20: Cross-table of deregulated industries 
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correction was applied so all effects are reported at a .025 significance level. It emerges that 
concentration level of engaging firms was significantly higher by vertical (U= 124400.5, r= -.08) 
and conglomerate type (U= 136996.00, r= -.07) when compared to horizontal type although 
effect size is small. Further, the highest mean of concentration was reached by conglomerate 
mergers259.  
 
Table 21: Cross-table of relationship of merger type and concentration of industry 
The previous discussion showed that out of vertical and conglomerate mergers the 
majority of them happened in high concentration and medium concentration industries (75.5% 
out of vertical deals, 77.5% out of conglomerate and out of horizontal only 66%). The 
comparison of concentration’s means by merger types brought more support to the fifth 
hypothesis. It was confirmed that by conglomerate and vertical mergers it can be predicted that 
level of concentration of engaging firms will be higher than by horizontal deals. Therefore it can 
be concluded that the fifth hypothesis was confirmed and occurrence of vertical and 
conglomerate mergers is higher than occurrence of horizontal mergers when merger is 
undertaken between less competitive industries260.  
                                                 
259 SPSS output can be seen in Appendix C.9. 
260 Alternatively as discussed in Data section of the thesis some of industries according to Davies, Lyons (1996) can 
be classified as the most concentrated although they were not in high concentration category. If correction is 
undertaken, i.e. industries tobacco, aviation, electronics and chemicals are added to high concentration category, the 
mean for horizontal deals stayed the lowest although two of top five most active industries are assigned to high 
concentration category. The only difference to not corrected data was that mean of horizontal deals in comparison to 
vertical type was not significantly different. Nevertheless, hypothesis 5 can be partly confirmed for conglomerate 
mergers, i.e. they occur more often than horizontal mergers in less competitive industries. 
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Looking on combination of concentration levels of acquirer and target will bring more 
insight if vertical mergers occur more often between acquirer and target with different level of 
concentration or with the same level. As less competitive industries are defined industries with 
high and medium concentration and as more competitive industries are defined industries with 
low and low-medium concentration. There are two combinations of acquirer and target possible: 
combination of less competitive acquirer (target) and more competitive target (acquirer) and 
combination of acquirer and target with the same level of competitiveness (i.e. both acquirer and 
target are more competitive or less competitive). The aim is to find if there are differences in 
occurrence of vertical mergers across these combinations and if this difference is significantly 
unlike to conglomerate mergers. 
 
Table 22: Cross-table of sector combinations of competitiveness and merger type 
  
Table 22 presents the relationship of combination of sectors and merger types. It can be seen 
that only small fraction of vertical mergers occur between less and more competitive acquirer 
and target, 15.3% compared to 84.7% representing combination between acquirer and target of 
the same level of competitiveness (measured by % within merger type). The same situation can 
be observed by conglomerate mergers although there is slightly higher share of combination 
between less and more competitive industries out of overall number of conglomerate mergers 
(21.7%). However, this difference is not significantly high enough; the chi square test proved 
Sub hypothesis 5a: The occurrence of vertical mergers will be even higher if these mergers 
will be undertaken between less competitive and more competitive industries.   
 80 
that there is no significant association between combination of less and more competitive 
acquirer and target and whether merger was vertical or conglomerate261. 
The previous discussion of results showed that the occurrence of vertical mergers is 
higher if they are undertaken between acquirer and target with same level of competitiveness 
(out of this combination 90% happen between less competitive acquirer and target). The same 
tendency is observed by conglomerate mergers although almost 60% of combination between 
less and more competitive acquirer and target are conglomerate mergers. This leads us to 
rejection of sub hypothesis 5a.  
 
 
 Vertical mergers occur more often if both acquirer and target are R&D intensive. On the 
contrary, by conglomerate mergers it can be predicted that level of R&D intensity will be 
different by acquirer and target i.e. there will be greater difference in this industry characteristics 
than by vertical mergers. In the discussion of results of sub hypothesis 3a it was showed that 
only 24.3% out of conglomerate mergers happened between R&D intensive acquirer and target. 
Furthermore, there was found a significant association between combination of R&D intensity of 
acquirer and target and whether merger was vertical or conglomerate χ2(1) = 19.25, p< .001. 
Besides the calculated odds ratio suggests that when deal happens between acquirer and target 
with different level of technology or between two low technology industries (accounting only for 
28.3% out of other combination) it is 3.07 times more likely to be conglomerate merger than 
vertical merger. Therefore it can be concluded that conglomerate mergers occur between firms 
with greater level of difference in R&D intensity than vertical and the sixth hypothesis can be 
confirmed.  
 
 
 Vertical mergers are predicted to happen between acquirer and target with different level 
of concentration and valuation. On the other hand, conglomerate mergers should occur more 
often between industries with comparable level of concentration and valuation. From discussion 
of sub hypothesis 5a it was showed that 78.3% out of conglomerate mergers are between 
acquirer and target with same level of concentration. This fact supports sub hypothesis 6a 
although the level of concentration of acquirer and target seems to be not significantly different 
for vertical and conglomerate mergers. Looking on the previous discussion of sub hypothesis 2a 
                                                 
261 See Appendix C.10. 
Hypothesis 6: Conglomerate mergers will occur between firms with greater level of difference 
in industry characteristics mergers in terms of R&D intensity than vertical. 
Sub hypothesis 6a: Conglomerate mergers will occur more often between the industries with 
comparable level of concentration and valuation. 
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showed that 94% out of conglomerate mergers happen between industries with same level of 
valuation. This represents the great share and furthermore it was found a significant association 
between valuation combination of sectors and whether merger was vertical or conglomerate χ2(1) 
= 27.64, p< .001. Besides the calculated odds ratio suggests that when deal happens between 
acquirer and target with the same level of valuation it is 4.37 times more likely to be 
conglomerate merger than vertical merger. This fact strongly supports the formulated hypothesis 
and it can be concluded that sub hypothesis 6a was confirmed. 
 
 
 
 In the previous data section of this thesis it was argued that classification of deal can be 
ordered from the less integrated to the highly integrated deals. As highly integrated deals can be 
defined mergers, majority ownership and control by acquisitions. On the other, less integrated 
deals are joint venture (control) and minority ownership. Table 23 presents how occurrences of 
merger types are allocated across different classification of deals. It can be seen that the share of 
horizontal mergers within categories of classification is increasing from the lowest to the highest 
integrated type, 27.3% by joint ventures to 66.7% by mergers (measured by % within 
classification of deal). The most out of horizontal mergers were majority ownership (control) 
deals accounting for 64.7% (measured by % within merger type). On the other hand, the majority 
of conglomerate mergers were joint ventures accounting for 55.7% and the majority of vertical 
mergers were majority ownerships (48.6%) closely followed by joint ventures (47.5%). These 
results suggests that mean of integration will be higher by horizontal mergers than by vertical 
and conglomerate mergers and since the integration by deals can be ranked this can be proved 
through Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. 
 Through Kruskal-Wallis test it was found out that integration level of deal is significantly 
affected by merger type, i.e. merger type indicates type of deal in terms of integration (H(2)= 
122.24, p< .001). Mann-Whitney tests were used to examine if horizontal M&A are deals with 
higher level of integration in comparison to vertical and conglomerate M&A. A Bonferroni 
correction was applied so all effects are reported at a .025 significance level. It emerges that 
integration level of deal was significantly higher by horizontal type when compared to vertical 
type (U= 232333.5, r= -.192) and conglomerate type (U= 194566.0, r= -.274). By comparison of 
horizontal and conglomerate the effect size is medium what makes the higher mean of 
integration by horizontal deal more reliable fact. Further, the highest mean of integration was 
Hypothesis 7:  The highly integrated type of deals will be more characterized by horizontal 
M&A and on the other hand, the less integrated type of deals will be more characterized by 
vertical and conglomerate M&A. 
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reached by horizontal deals, followed by vertical deals and the lowest mean of integration was 
by conglomerate deals262. 
 
Table 23: Cross-table of classification of deal and merger type 
 
 Both cross-table and comparison of integration’s means among merger types suggests 
that highly integrated types of deals are more likely to be horizontal type than vertical and 
conglomerate types. Therefore it can be concluded that the seventh hypothesis is confirmed. 
 
 
 From Table 23 it can be seen out of joint ventures 34.5% are vertical type. Although this 
is higher share than the share of horizontal type, 38.1% of joint ventures are conglomerate type 
what represents the highest share within joint ventures. Therefore it can be concluded that sub 
hypothesis 7a can be rejected. 
 
 
                                                 
262 See SPSS output in Appendix C.11. 
Sub hypothesis 7a:  There will be more vertical JVs than other types of JVs. 
Sub hypothesis 7b:  The industries with highly specific assets will engage more in the highly 
integrated type of deal. 
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 In the beginning of results’ discussion for this sub hypothesis clarification of definitions 
will be presented. As industries with highly specific assets are defined industries with high level 
of technology and knowledge-intensive industries. On the other hand, industries with lowly 
specific assets are industries with all other levels of technology i.e. low, low-medium and 
medium-high technology. As highly integrated type of deals are considered mergers and majority 
ownerships and as deals with low integration level are defined joint ventures and minority 
ownerships. Table 24 presents how technology level interacts with integration of deal. It can be 
seen that industries with highly specific assets engage more in highly integrated deals however 
the difference to lowly integrated deals is only small, 50.8% compared to 49.2% (measured by % 
within asset specificity). Similarly, industries with lowly specific asset engage more in highly 
integrated deals (58.4%) but this share is higher than by industries with high specific assets. 
Furthermore, there was found a significant association between asset specificity and whether 
deal was highly or lowly integrated χ2(1) = 8.578, p< .01263. However, the calculated odds ratio 
suggests the opposite tendency than predicted it is 1.36 more likely to expect less integrated deal 
when engaging firm possesses highly specific assets. This odds ratio is rather small therefore it 
can not be reliably predicted that asset specificity will suggests the level of deal integration; the 
association between variables is not substantial.  
 
Table 24: Cross-table of integration level and asset specificity of industry 
 
From the previous discussion it can be argued that industry with highly specific assets is 
predicted to engage in lowly integrated deal more often than industry with lowly specific assets 
although this association is not substantial. This represents the contradiction to the predicted 
relationship therefore the sub hypothesis 7b can be rejected.  
                                                 
263 See Appendix C.12. 
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6.3. Discussion 
 
After presentation of results and analysis of hypotheses the discussion will summarize 
and interpret the findings. As predicted it was found out that different M&A types cluster by 
industries i.e. industries experience more deals of one type than other. The aim was to examine 
which industry’s characteristics have influence on occurrence of specific merger type. Most of 
the formulated hypotheses were confirmed therefore general implications can be made. On the 
other hand, some of hypotheses were rejected therefore possible reasons for rejection will be 
discussed.  
The results showed the highest share of horizontal mergers in overall amount of deals 
over time period from 1990 till 2000 accounting for 60%. This is similar to findings in Andrade 
et al. (2001) where for period from 1990 till 1998 the share of 47.8% was reached by horizontal 
mergers. The higher share found in this research might be due to the different time period and 
consistent growth of horizontal deals’ number. Sub hypothesis 1a was confirmed only on 
absolute occurrences not on the share of horizontal mergers over the years. It is natural that the 
share of horizontal mergers fluctuates from year to year therefore to detect increasing share of 
horizontal mergers within overall number of deals it will be inevitable to look on the longer time 
period than one year as it was done in Andrade et al. (2001) where the increasing share of 
horizontal mergers was detected from decade to decade.  
Hypothesis 2 and sub hypothesis 2a have dealt with valuation of sectors. Notably, 
conglomerate mergers tend to occur at most in more overvalued sectors what was affirmed by 
the highest mean of PBV and this difference was significant to horizontal type. Furthermore, sub 
hypothesis 2a (deals should occur more often between undervalued and overvalued sectors) was 
confirmed only for vertical mergers and not for conglomerate mergers. Although vertical and 
conglomerate mergers are somehow similar and they are pursued from different reasons than 
horizontal mergers conglomerate mergers are at most often pursued from irrational motives and 
therefore they often differ from rationales developed for vertical deals; this fact can be seen also 
at confirmed hypothesis 6 and sub hypothesis 6a which have dealt with this reasoning.  
Hypothesis 3 and sub hypothesis 3a have dealt with asset specificity measured by R&D 
intensity. Both of them were confirmed (although mean technology level by vertical deals was 
significantly different only to mean of horizontal deals) what suggests that vertical mergers are at 
most appropriate for industries with highly specific assets especially when both acquirer and 
target possess these assets. Interestingly, it was found that knowledge-intensive industries engage 
in deals only with other knowledge-intensive or high technology industries. 
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From one of the merger wave theories, the industry shock wave theory, hypothesis 4 and 
sub hypothesis 4a were formulated. However, they were both rejected therefore it can be argued 
that deregulation had no effect on increase in merger cases in most of the deregulated industries. 
The possible reasons for the absenting effect might be that deregulation was not substantial to 
motivate firms to engage in mergers or the effect might show after longer period than the 
examined in this research. Furthermore, the overall situation on the market and other factors 
might have greater effect than deregulation on mergers.  
Hypothesis 5 and sub hypothesis 5a have dealt with competitiveness of industries. 
Vertical and conglomerate mergers tend to occur more often in less competitive industries than 
horizontal mergers (difference in means was significant). However, sub hypothesis 5a was 
rejected and it was found that vertical mergers occur more often between acquirer and target with 
same level of competitiveness than with different levels. This might be caused by the fact that 
firms engaging in vertical merger follow the rationale that they can reach higher market power 
only in less competitive markets but they do not realize that also when acquirer or target is more 
competitive the same positive effect can be reached with less competition authorities’ concerns.  
Hypothesis 7 was sort of control hypothesis to examine if other factors have influence on 
occurrence of specific types of mergers than just industry’s characteristics. It was found out that 
highly integrated deals such as mergers and majority ownerships tend to be horizontal type and 
on the other hand, less integrated deals such as joint ventures and minority ownerships tend to be 
more vertical and conglomerate types. Besides conglomerate mergers are characterized by the 
least integrated types on overall. Furthermore, sub hypothesis 7a was rejected there were more 
conglomerate than vertical joint ventures. This might be caused by the fact that conglomerate 
mergers are associated with fewer benefits for engaging firms and higher risk of failure therefore 
it is rational to choose joint venture for them because the integration in this deal is low and they 
can break the cooperation easily when the wished results are not achieved. Sub hypothesis 7b 
was also rejected and it was found there is no strong association between asset specificity and 
level of integration of deal what might be caused by the fact that there are other more important 
factors influencing choice of deal by industries with specific assets than level of integration.  
To conclude the summary of situations when to expect different M&A types is presented. 
Horizontal mergers are to be expected more in overvalued sectors than undervalued sectors, in 
more competitive industries, in industries with less specific assets and they are mostly 
undertaken in form of highly integrated deals such as mergers and majority ownerships. Vertical 
type of deal is to be expected when industry possesses highly specific assets especially when 
both acquirer and target possess these assets, in less competitive industries and if the acquirer 
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and target are operating in industries with different levels of valuation i.e. between overvalued 
and undervalued sectors. Conglomerate type is to be expected in the least competitive industries 
especially when acquirer and target have comparable level of competitiveness, if acquirer and 
target are both in overvalued sectors, if acquirer and target are on different level of asset 
specificity and they tend to be done through the least integrated deals especially joint ventures.  
Looking on top five industries characterized by each type of merger confirms the 
previous implications. This is especially valid for industries characterized by horizontal deals, 
four of them are either at low technology or medium-low technology levels, they are all more 
competitive industries and all of them are overvalued although only lowly. By industries 
characterized by vertical mergers two of them are knowledge-intensive (software and finance) 
what confirms asset specificity rationale. Industries characterized by conglomerate mergers show 
the highest level of valuation since engineering and service are in low-medium overvalued 
category. Interestingly, three of top five industries characterized by conglomerate mergers are 
knowledge-intensive (engineering, finance and service).  
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to present and test empirically new aspect in M&A activity- 
clustering of different M&A types by industries. A theoretical introduction consisted of defining 
different merger types, the underlying motivation factors and overview of merger waves. 
Further, the relevant literature dealing with various M&A aspects is discussed in order to 
formulate hypotheses for the research. The subsequent testing of the merger cases notified to the 
European Union brought insight how industries’ characteristics affect the choice of the right 
merger type.  
 The results of the research were in accordance with findings in Gugler et al. (2012) and 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) which showed that behavioral merger wave theories such as the 
overvalued shares theory have greater explanatory power than other theories, q-theory and 
industry shock theory. The confirmation of hypothesis 2 dealing with valuation of sectors 
supported the overvalued shares theory of merger waves and on the other hand, the rejection of 
hypothesis 4 dealing with deregulation confirmed that industry shock theory is less reliable.  
 Further, transaction cost theory and the underlying rationales especially the cases when a 
firm deals with highly specific assets as discussed in Williamson (1979) were confirmed to have 
effect on M&A activity, vertical deals are in the case of highly specific assets the most 
appropriate type of merger to choose. Additionally, it was confirmed that conglomerate deals are 
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undertaken from almost the same reasons as the vertical transactions but they deviate more from 
the formulated rationales what suggests that they have the lowest potential for the increased 
performance of the combined firm and are followed from the least rational motives such as 
diversification and risk reduction.  
 The further research is necessary in order to support the here presented results. The 
deviations in findings are possible to detect and they might lead to reconsiderations of the 
implications. The most interesting comparison would be to the US merger cases in order to 
identify the possible differences on these two M&A markets. Furthermore, the more accurate 
measurements of industries’ characteristics might contribute to the reliability of the results.  
 In the end, it can be concluded that the research successfully answered two formulated 
research questions and confirmed the clustering of different M&A types by industries along with 
the great effect of industries’ characteristics on this relationship.   
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Statistics of EC Merger Regulation till May 2012 
 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf, accessed on 6.6.2012, regularly 
updated 
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Appendix B: Additional information to Data section 
Appendix B.1.: Table of vertical linkages between industries 1/2 
Sector  Vertical linkages: Number of vertical related sectors, specific sectors
advertising 2 business service, service
agriculture 2 food, health
airline 11 aviation, business services, distribution, distribution durables and non-durables, engineering, oil, service, transport equipment, transportation, travel
apparel and fabric products 5 furniture, leather, non-food retail, retail, textile
automobile 10 electronics, furniture, industrial machinery/manufacturing, measuring instruments etc, non-food retail, optics, plastics, primary metals, renting
aviation 5 airline, defence, measuring instruments etc, optics, transport equipment
banking 7 business services, construction, consultancy, finance, insurance, real estate, service
business services 13 advertising, airline, banking, computers, construction, consultancy, engineering, entertainment, finance, publishing, real estate, service, telecommunication
catering trade 5 food, health, real estate, retail, travel
chemicals 10 cosmetics, detergents, health, mining, oil, pharmaceuticals, plastics, primary metals, stone clay etc, utilities
computers 9 business services, consultancy, electronics/IT hardware, engineering, finance, post, service, software, telecommunications
conglomerate
25 banking, business services, defence, distribution durables/non-durables, electronics, engineering, finance, furniture, industrial machinery/manufacturing, 
mining, (non-food) retail, oil, packaging, plastics, primary metals, real estate, renting, service, stone clay etc, waste management, wood
consultancy 5 banking, business services, computers, finance, service
cosmetics 1 chemicals
defence 10 aviation, construction, food, industrial machinery, post, real estate, telecommunication, transport equipment, utilities, waste management
detergent business 1 chemicals
distribution 5 airline, construction, food, transportation, travel
distribution durables 4 airline, construction, transportation, travel
distribution non-durables 6 airline, construction, food, transportation, travel, (non-food) retail
electronics 6 automobile, construction, electronics/IT hardware, industrial machinery, primary metals, telecommunication
electronics/IT Hardware 2 computers, electronics
engineering 7 airline, business services, computers, construction, service, software, telecommunication
entertainment 3 publishing, business services, service
environmental reclamation 1 utilities
finance 9 banking, business services, computers, construction, consultancy, insurance, post, real estate, service, telecommunication
food 9 agriculture, catering, defence, distribution (non-durables), paper, plastics, retail, tobacco
furniture 6 apparel and fabric products, automobile, construction, leather, textile, wood
health 8 agriculture, catering, chemicals, measuring instruments etc, (non-food) retail, optics, pharmaceuticals
holding
industrial machinery 10 automobile, construction, defence, electronics, industrial manufacturing, measuring instruments etc, optics, plastics, primary metals, renting
industrial manufacturing 4 industrial machinery, automobile, construction, primary metals
construction
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Appendix B.1.: Table of vertical linkages between industries 2/2 
Sector  Vertical linkages: Number of vertical related sectors, specific sectors
insurance 3 banking, finance, real estate
investment holding
leather 4 apparel and fabric products, furniture, retail, textile
measuring instruments, 6 automobile, aviation, health, industrial machinery, optics, telecommunication, transport equipment
photographic goods, clocks
mining 4 construction, chemicals, oil, stone clay etc
non-food retail 9 apparel and fabric products, automobile, construction, distribution non-durables, health, post, real estate, telecommunication, textile
oil 6 airline, construction, chemicals, mining, stone clay etc, utilities
optics 7 automobile, aviation, health, industrial machinery, measuring instruments etc, telecommunication, transport equipment
packaging 2 construction, paper
paper 3 food, packaging, publishing
pharmaceuticals 2 chemicals, health
plastics 5 automobile, construction, food, chemicals, industrial machinery
post 7 computers, defence, finance, (non-food) retail, telecommunication, transportation
primary metal industries 6 automobile, construction, electronics, chemicals, industrial machinery/manufacturing
publishing 4 business services, entertainment, paper, service
real estate 10 banking, business services, catering, construction, defence, finance, insurance, (non-food) retail, service
recycling 2 utilities, waste management
renting 3 automobile, construction, industrial machinery
retail 11 apparel and fabric products, catering, construction, distribution non-durables, food, health, leather, post, real estate, telecommunication, textile
service 13 advertising,airline,banking, business service, computers, construction, consultancy, engineering,entertainment,finance,publishing,real estate,telecommunication
software 2 computers, engineering
stone, clay, glass and concrete products 4 construction, chemicals, mining, oil
telecommunication 12 business services, computers, defence, electronics, engineering, finance, (non-food) retail, post, service, measuring instruments etc, optics
textile 5 apparel and fabric products, furniture, leather, (non-food) retail
tobacco 1 food
transport equipment 5 airline, aviation, defence, measuring instruments etc, optics
transportation 6 airline, distribution durables/non-durables, post, travel
travel 6 airline, distribution durables/non-durables, transportation
utilities 6 defence, environmental reclamation, chemicals, oil, recycling, waste management
waste management 4 construction, defence, recycling, utilities
wood 2 construction, furniture  
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Appendix B.2.: Overview of industries with corresponding PBV (adapted from various data sets 
available on http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html) 
EU 2002 EU 2011 US 1999
advertising 4,64 1,39 8,11
agriculture 0,96 1,11 n/a
airline 0,80 0,78 2,34
apparel and fabric products 2,37 2,05 2,52
automobile 1,36 1,13 2,58
automobile (food) n/a n/a n/a
automobile conglomerate n/a n/a n/a
aviation 1,58 1,63 2,53
banking 1,06 0,5 2,94
business services 2,15 2,98 3,02
catering trade 1,64 1,11 n/a
chemicals 1,66 1,59 4,38
computers 2,43 2,18 9,65
conglomerate n/a n/a n/a
construction 1,34 1,23 1,70
consultancy 2,62 2,98 n/a
cosmetics 3,85 1,97 9,81
defence 1,58 1,63 2,53
detergent business 0,61 1,97 n/a
distribution 1,37 1,29 1,96
distribution durables 1,37 1,29 1,96
distribution non-durables 1,37 1,29 1,96
electronics 1,80 1,79 4,06
electronics/IT Hardware 1,80 1,79 4,06
engineering 2,76 1,05 n/a
entertainment 2,36 1,61 3,74
environmental reclamation 2,21 2,01 4,62
finance 1,58 0,69 3,67
food 3,02 2,42 3,31
furniture 1,14 1,35 3,19
health 4,41 2,07 n/a
health / computers 1,86 1,3 n/a
holding n/a n/a n/a
industrial machinery 1,68 2,32 2,61
industrial manufacturing 2,02 2,94 n/a
insurance 1,24 0,74 2,63
investment holding 0,84 1,21 1,23
leather 3,50 2,05 2,93
measuring instruments, etc 2,82 3,53 3,93
mining 0,84 1,42 1,98
non-food retail 3,73 3,89 n/a
oil 1,73 1,43 2,69
optics 2,81 3,24 n/a
packaging 1,56 1,02 2,57
paper 1,42 0,71 2,01
pharmaceuticals 4,34 2,9 10,86
plastics 1,93 2,04 n/a
post 2,15 1,45 n/a
primary metal industries 1,31 1,57 2,99
publishing 2,41 1,75 5,68
real estate 1,11 0,93 n/a
recycling 1,03 2,01 n/a
renting 4,55 1,84 n/a
retail 1,56 1,28 5,04
service 2,15 2,98 3,02
software 3,51 3,25 11,81
stone, clay, glass etc 1,04 1,23 2,85
telecommunication 1,31 1,45 6,12
textile 4,81 2,05 1,51
tobacco 3,84 5,2 7,13
transport equipment 3,93 1,29 1,96
transportation 2,15 1,29 1,96
travel 1,23 1,29 1,96
utilities 1,57 1,59 2,31
waste management 2,51 2,01 n/a
wood 0,82 0,71 2,01
PBV
Industry
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Appendix B.3.: OECD classification of manufacturing industries according to technological 
intensity: 1991-1997 
 
 
Appendix B.4.: OECD classification of knowledge intensive industries 
 ISIC Rev.3 
1. Post and telecommunications 
2. Finance and insurance 
3. Business activities (not including real estate) 
4. Education and health sectors (alternatively for some countries) 
64 
65-67 
71-74 
Source: OECD, STI Scoreboard 2003, p.140 
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Appendix C: SPSS outputs 
Appendix C.1.: SPSS output for PBV averages in year 2002 and 2011 
 
 
Wilcoxon signed ranked test 
 
 
Appendix C.2.: SPSS output for relationship between industry sector and merger type 
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Table 25: Contingency table
264
 
                                                 
264 In larger contingency tables is acceptable to have up to 20% of expected frequencies below 5. However, if 
industry sector agriculture with 16 occurrences is excluded in order to eliminate cells with expected count less than 
5 the chi square remains highly significant only its value decreases (χ2 (68)= 484.664, p< .001). 
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Appendix C.3.: SPSS output for Hypothesis 2 
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Appendix C.4.: SPSS output for Sub hypothesis 2a 
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Appendix C.5.: SPSS output for hypothesis 3 
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Appendix C.6.: SPSS output for Sub hypothesis 3a 
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Appendix C.7.: SPSS output for Hypothesis 4 
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Appendix C.8.: SPSS output for Sub hypothesis 4a 
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Appendix C.10.: SPSS output for Sub hypothesis 5a 
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Appendix C.12.: SPSS output for Sub hypothesis 7b 
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Abstract 
 Firms are constantly seeking for a growth and improved performance; one of the options 
how to reach this goal is to engage in mergers and acquisitions. Indeed M&A activity is 
increasing all over the world and over the past years. Many aspects of M&A have been a concern 
of the vast research and there are still unexplored areas. This thesis contributes to the standing 
findings and aims at an extending of existing knowledge about M&A.  
 This paper consists of two main parts; the theoretical and the empirical part. The first one 
reviews the theoretical foundations of M&A activity, especially it defines the different merger 
types, motivation factors of M&A, summarizes the past merger waves and lists the merger waves 
theories. Furthermore, the relevant literature concerned with clustering of M&A activity by 
industries and the different merger types is reviewed. In accordance with the theory, the 
hypotheses for the research are formulated. 
 The empirical part deals mainly with the answering two research questions on merger 
cases notified to the European Commission from 1990 till 2000. Firstly, whether M&A types 
cluster by industries what was confirmed on the fact that some industries experience more 
horizontal deals while some are characterized mostly with vertical or conglomerate transactions. 
The second question aims at answering which industries’ characteristics have the effect on the 
occurrence of specific merger type. The four main characteristics were reviewed; the valuation 
of industries, possession of specific assets, industry deregulation and the competitiveness of 
industry. Some of them can be validated as the good predictors in which type of merger the firm 
in the specific industry will rationally engage e.g. a firm with highly specific assets will 
undertake most probably vertical merger. Altogether, it can be argued that this paper brought 
more insight on M&A activity in terms of clustering and determinants of different merger types.  
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
Firmen streben dauernd nach dem Wachstum und der verbesserten Leistung; eine von 
den Möglichkeiten, wie dieses Ziel zu erreichen, ist  Fusionen und Übernahme durchzuführen. 
M&A Aktivität steigt tatsächlich weltweit und im Laufe der vergangen Jahre an. Viele Aspekte 
von M&A sind ein Teil von der gewaltigen Forschung geworden aber es gibt noch unerforschte 
Bereiche. Diese Magisterabeit  trägt zu vorliegenden Feststellungen bei und erstrebt zu der 
Erweiterung von bestehenden M&A Kenntnissen. 
Diese Arbeit besteht aus zwei Teilen; dem theoretischen und empirischen Teil. Der erste 
Teil stellt die theoretischen Grundlagen von M&A Aktivität zusammen, besonders die 
Definitionen von unterschiedlichen Arten von Fusionen, die Motive für M&A,  die vergangenen 
M&A-Wellen  und erfasst die Theorien von M&A-Wellen. Weiterhin ist die Übersicht der 
zuständigen Fachliteratur, die sich mit der Gruppierung von M&A Aktivität und verschiedenen 
Arten von M&A befasst, eingeführt. Gemäß der Theorie sind die Hypothesen für die Forschung 
aufgestellt. 
Im empirischen Teil geht es hauptsächlich um die Beantwortung von zwei 
Forschungsfragen anhand M&A Fällen, die durch die Europäische Kommission von 1990 bis 
2000 notifiziert wurden. Erstens, ob sich die Arten von M&A nach den Industriezweigen 
gruppieren und das bestätigt die  Tatsache, dass einige Branchen mehrere horizontale 
Transaktionen durchführen, während andere von den vertikalen und konglomeraten 
Transaktionen gekennzeichnet sind. Die zweite Frage zielt auf die Beantwortung ab, welche 
Eigenschaften von Branchen einen Einfluss auf das Auftreten von bestimmter M&A Art haben. 
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird der Überblick von vier spezifischen Eigenschaften eingeführt; 
die Bewertung von Branchen, der Besitz von speziellen Vermögenswerten, die Deregulierung 
von Industriezweigen und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von Branchen. Manche von ihnen sind als 
gute Prädiktoren von der Auswahl der M&A Art, die eine Firma vernünftigt durchführen wird, 
bestätigt z.B. eine Firma mit speziellen Vermögenswerten wird höchstwahrscheinlich eine 
vertikale Transaktion durchführen. Ingesamt kann es argumentiert werden, dass diese Arbeit 
einen wertvollen Einblick hinsichtlich der Gruppierung von M&A Aktivität und den 
Determinanten der verschiedenen Arten von M&A gebracht hat. 
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